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Abstract
Recently, database users have begun to use cloud database services to outsource their databases.
The reason for this is the high computation speed and the huge storage capacity that cloud owners
provide at low prices. However, despite the attractiveness of the cloud computing environment to
database users, privacy issues remain a cause for concern for database owners since data access is
out of their control. Encryption is the only way of assuaging users’ fears surrounding data privacy,
but executing Structured Query Language (SQL) queries over encrypted data is a challenging task,
especially if the data are encrypted by a randomized encryption algorithm. Many researchers have
addressed the privacy issues by encrypting the data using deterministic, onion layer, or
homomorphic encryption. Nevertheless, even with these systems, the encrypted data can still be
subjected to attack. In this research, we first propose an indexing scheme to encode the original
table’s tuples into bit vectors (BVs) prior to the encryption. The resulting index is then used to
narrow the range of retrieved encrypted records from the cloud to a small set of records that are
candidates for the user’s query. Based on the indexing scheme, we then design three different
models to execute SQL queries over the encrypted data. The data are encrypted by a single
randomized encryption algorithm, namely the Advanced Encryption Standard AES-CBC. In each
proposed scheme, we use a different (secure) method for storing and maintaining the index values
(BVs) (i.e., either at user’s side or at the cloud server), and we extend each system to support most
of relational algebra operators, such as select, join, etc. Implementation and evaluation of the
proposed systems reveals that they are practical and efficient at reducing both the computation and
space overhead when compared with state-of-the-art systems like CryptDB.
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1

Introduction

In the contemporary electronic era, both individuals and organizations need scalable data storage
and high-performance computing units to process and store their data. Historically, only large
organizations/ companies have been able to own such units, as they were not affordable for most
individuals and small companies. With the rise of cloud computing, however, this problem has
been solved, as users can now rent storage and computational units as needed at an affordable
price. Most cloud providers provide databases as a service, which allow individual users and
companies to outsource their data and access them at any time, from any location. According to
the report in [1], the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of cloud database market is anticipated
to be 46.78% in 2023 [Figure 1.1]. However, given that privacy breaches are one of the most
common threats in the cloud computing environment, many people have expressed concerns about
privacy when outsourcing sensitive data. For instance, untrustworthy cloud service providers
might steal personal customer information—such as email addresses, mailing addresses, and phone
numbers—and sell that information to third parties, who can then use it to send irritating
advertisements to users via email, mail, and telephone.
More importantly, attackers who target a cloud provider can gain access to customers’
sensitive personal information, such as social security numbers (SSNs). This has serious
consequences, as criminals can use these data to impersonate customers in situations such as
financial transactions (e.g., telephone banking). Thus, sensitive data are restricted from being
processed or sold to a third party. Therefore, significant evolutions in the cloud computing
environment could make such services unattractive to consumers if changes occur without also
providing appropriate solutions for privacy breach issue. Such an issue must be tackled if cloud
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providers are to gain the trust of users and organizations so that they will outsource sensitive data
without worrying about data leakages.
Data encryption effectively solves the problem of privacy breaches by ensuring that cloud
providers cannot learn from the data they store. The easiest way is to encrypt the entire table and
outsource it. Then to process a query, the entire table must be retrieved and decrypted. However,
the application of this technique conflicts with purpose of the databases and the critical
functionalities of cloud environments (e.g., searching). Other researchers have used a proxy (i.e.,
a trusted third-party server), rather than the user, as an additional component to carry out the
encryption and decryption processes. To make this approach practical, each datum must be
encrypted with more than one encryption algorithm to support various query types [2]. However,
in the case of very large data sets, this approach comes with the penalty of a significant
computational burden, as each datum might be decrypted more than once. Various researchers

Figure 1.1 Anticipated market growth in 2023
Source: https://www.marketresearchfuture.com/reports/cloud-database-market-6847
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have proposed numerous systems using different encryption techniques to protect data
confidentiality. In the following subsection, we explore the common encryption algorithms that
have been adopted in state-of-the-art research on cloud database security.
1.1

Encryption Algorithms

1.1.1 Order-Preserving Encryption
Order-preserving encryption (OPE) is a functional encryption technique to encrypt data such that
range queries (e.g., maximum, minimum, and inequality operators) can be implemented on
encrypted data without encrypting the operands or decrypting the data [3], [4]. This type of
encryption uses a function to compare the order of the ciphertexts to allow comparison operations
of the encrypted numeric data. This type of algorithm preserves the original data order. For
example, if c1 is the ciphertext of m1, and c2 is the ciphertext of m2, then the comparison of c1 and
c2 is as follows:
(c1 < c2 if m1 < m2 ); (c1 > c2 if m1 > m2 ); or (c1 = c2 if m1 = m2)
The security of this type of encryption is downgraded if the adversary infers the ciphertext of a
certain plaintext. Also, this type of encryption is vulnerable to inference attacks as in [5], [6].
1.1.2 Deterministic Encryption
In deterministic encryption (DE) schemes, given the encryption key k and the messages m, the
ciphertext of m is always the same when encrypted with k, even in multiple executions of DE.
While DE can be used in keyword searches, it does not preserve the order if used with numeric
values. AES-SIV is an example of a deterministic algorithm. DE is widely used in securing cloud
databases. However, privacy can be compromised in this scheme if the attacker is able to identify
the ciphertext of a certain plaintext word (e.g., if he establishes the ciphertext of “Alice,” then he
is able to determine which tuples contain “Alice”).
3

1.1.3 Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HOM) is a method of encryption that allows for the performance of
certain arithmetic operations (i.e., addition and multiplication) on ciphertexts without the need to
decrypt them. There are two types of HOM: partially HOM and fully HOM. Partially HOM
supports either addition or multiplication, while fully HOM supports both operations. HOM can
secure numeric data in cloud environments; however, encrypting with HOM produces long
ciphertexts, since this type of encryption is based on an asymmetric encryption system. Also,
computation performance on HOM ciphertexts is downgraded as the volume of ciphertexts
increases [7].
1.1.4 Randomized Encryption
Randomized encryption intends to produce different ciphertexts for each plaintext, i.e., no more
than one ciphertext has the same plaintext. Essentially, in this scheme, in addition to the secret
key, an initialization vector (IV) must be XORed with the first block of the plaintext, and a new
ciphertext must therefore be obtained each time the algorithm is executed [8]. While this
encryption technique provides the highest security level for outsourced databases, it has a major
drawback in cloud databases—namely, the inability to execute SQL queries over ciphertexts.
1.1.5 Onion Encryption
The term “onion layers encryption” was first developed by the authors in [2]. In onion encryption,
cloud servers are able to execute different SQL statements while data remain secret. In the onion
encryption, each layer is a ciphertext of a specific encryption methodology (e.g., DET, OPE, HOM,
or RAN). The inner layer is the ciphertext of the algorithm with the lowest security level, while
the outer layer is the ciphertext with the highest security level (i.e., randomized). The main flaw
of this approach is the intensive computation that results from decrypting all of the encryption
4

layers, which leads to slower query processing. In addition, the space required for the encrypted
databases is about 3.75 times that required for the unencrypted databases [2].
1.2

Summary of Contributions

In this dissertation, we first designed a novel indexing scheme for randomized encrypted databases,
which is based on defining a partitioning tree (PT) for all domain partitions for sensitive columns
in a table (i.e., dividing each column into sub-columns where each sub-column represents a set of
values). The PT is then used to encode records into bit vectors (BVs), wherein each bit position is
mapped to a specific partition and is only set to one if the value belongs to the set of values
represented by that partition. The BVs are used to retrieve only part of the outsourced encrypted
records. Second, we suggested three secure prototypes based on our proposed indexing technique.
In each model, we use a different method of storing and handling the BVs (either on a private
cloud server or on a third-party cloud server). Third, for each system, we proposed different
algorithms to process most of the relational algebra operators on encrypted data without revealing
the confidentiality of data. Fourth, we conducted several experiments to evaluate different aspects
of the proposed systems—including, but not limited to, time overhead and space overhead—against three well-known approaches: CryptDB [2], columns-based fragmentation [9], and one
block-based encryption [10]. Our experiments showed that the proposed systems outperformed
most of the competing approaches in both time and space overhead.
The rest of this document is organized as follow: in section 2, we explain different security
enforcement schemes for the cloud databases, then we survey the state-of–the-art approaches to
secure outsourced databases. Section 3 details the proposed systems in this dissertation, followed
by the implementation and evaluation details in section 4. Finally, we provided a conclusion of
this dissertation and discussed some of the future work in section 5.
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2

Related Work

The powerful features of the cloud computing environment—such as enormous capacity and highperformance computing units—have attracted database owners in both small and large companies.
These features have made it necessary to obtain and maintain the incredibly expensive storage and
computation units to process vast databases at affordable prices. In spite of the advantages of cloud
computing, data security is the main drawback of using cloud services to outsource databases. The
work of securing databases began when networking and internet technology advanced and were
adopted by major companies. This, in turn, fueled the need for databases as a service for
individuals and entities requiring high storage capacity and computation. Data privacy, integrity,
and confidentiality are in danger when databases are outsourced, since the database owner loses
control over who can access and read their data.
To address these issues, researchers began to develop various approaches to protect user data
from unauthorized access and data breaches, using data access control, data encryption, or both
[11], [12]. Data access control functions by regulating what object O a subject S can access and
what operations Op that S can perform on O. Encryption, in contrast, works by encoding plaintext
data into ciphertext (i.e., an unreadable format). Each method has its advantages and
disadvantages. For example, access control is intended to increase computing performance, while
encryption decreases it. In addition, encryption protects against data breaches from both internal
and external attacks, whereas data privacy can be compromised in such cases when the access
control mechanism is enforced, since adversaries might bypass predefined access roles to access
data. Regardless of the heavy computational work required by encryption schemes, encryption is
still the preferred security mechanism for most database users.

6

2.1

Security Issues in Cloud Computing

Despite the powerful features of cloud computing, there are many issues and vulnerabilities that
can be exploited by malicious actors against outsourced data. One type of security issues—
privileges abuse—involves the use of legitimate privileges for malicious purposes (e.g., a user in
company A with the privilege to view company A’s sales records who uses their privileges to fetch
sales tuples and pass them to competitor company B). Another vulnerability in the cloud
environment occurs when a user is assigned privileges that exceed what is necessary to perform
their job. This can create a potential threat if such privileges are abused, either by the user or an
attacker compromising the user’s account. Cloud environments may also be vulnerable to SQL
injection, i.e., injecting SQL queries to act against the objective of an application. The injected
SQL statement is inserted into an executable statement which, in turn, can fetch data that the
attacker wants to obtain (e.g., injecting a query to retrieve all of the records in a given table).
Malicious insider attacks are a form of attacks that are performed from inside the cloud
organization, with very little chance of detection. The attacker can access sensitive data and leak
or maliciously process them in a way that violates system policies.
A data breach is defined as the accessing or obtaining of sensitive information—such as
medical records, student information, employees’ salaries, and so on—in an unauthorized manner.
Such problems occur when data access is not restricted and when API access control is weak.
Other cloud attacks may exploit the following: weak authentication; unpatched services; or
insecure system architecture (e.g., keeping sensitive and non-sensitive data in the same database
without implementing any form of encryption for the sensitive data).
One solution to concerns about the above-mentioned vulnerabilities is applying data
encryption to the sensitive data. For example, in an SQL injection attack, if the attacker injects a
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query to fetch the entire set of the database, the attacker will learn nothing if the sensitive data are
encrypted. However, security level differs by the type of encryption used. Weak encryption
techniques can be compromised by cryptographic attacks, which exploit a vulnerability in the
cryptographic, such as a weakness in a cipher, key management scheme, code, or cryptographic
protocol. In this dissertation, we focus on encryption strategy as a method of protecting data from
the cloud database vulnerabilities listed above. In the next sub-section, we survey the most popular
encryption schemes that have been used by state-of-the-art database security systems in the field
of cloud computing.
2.2

Encryption-Based Solutions to Protect Cloud Databases

Encryption is defined as encoding plaintext into unreadable formats, which preserves the
confidentiality and privacy of the data. There are two types of encryptions: symmetric and
asymmetric. In symmetric encryption, only one encryption key (i.e., the secret key sk) is used to
encrypt and decrypt the data. The sk is known by both the encryptor and decryptor entities;
however, it must be kept secret. The most popular symmetric encryption algorithms are the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Blowfish algorithms. In [13], the authors conducted a
comparative analysis of the AES and Blowfish algorithms and found that AES was faster than
Blowfish by nearly 200 ms when used to encrypt or decrypt the same file. Asymmetric encryption,
on the other hand, involves using two keys—a public key and a private key—to encrypt and
decrypt the data. To guarantee confidentiality, the receiver’s public key is used to encrypt the data,
while the private key, associated with the receiver’s public key, is the only key used in the
decryption process and must be kept secret. Asymmetric encryption systems are computationally
intensive and slow down the encryption and decryption processes [14]. Some examples of well-
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known asymmetric encryption systems include RSA, ElGamal, Diffie-Hellman, and ECC. For
more details about asymmetric encryption algorithms, see [15], [16], and [17].
When choosing an encryption system, a variety of factors must be considered, including
security level, computation overhead, and complexity, among others. For instance, the
computation overhead of asymmetric encryption is higher than that of symmetric encryption
because, in an asymmetric system, the usage of CPU cycles is higher than in a symmetric scheme.
Moreover, the security level in both systems differs based on the type of algorithm used (e.g.,
randomized algorithms are more secure than deterministic algorithms) and whether a strong sk was
used to encrypt the data. In a symmetric system, the security level is high, and the chance of
compromising the sk (for, e.g., a sk length of 256 bits in AES) is virtually nonexistent. Accordingly,
symmetric algorithms are more widely used than asymmetric algorithms.
Data encryption is the only solution for protecting outsourced databases that prevents data
leakage resulting from any form of unauthorized data access in the cloud. However, it is
challenging to execute SQL queries over encrypted databases. The existing literature on cloud
database security offers a variety of techniques to overcome this problem and deal with outsourced
encrypted databases. While most state-of-the-art systems aim to provide security, efficiency (i.e.,
time required to execute SQL queries) varies depending on the technique used; the higher security
level provided, the lower performance level achieved. In the following subsection, we explore each
strategy used to deal with outsourced encrypted databases. We then review the research offering
solutions within each strategy.
2.3

Current Approaches to Process SQL Queries over Encrypted Databases

Early attempts to secure databases encrypted the whole database, with each record encrypted as
one block (e.g., if a table has four sensitive columns before encryption, the encrypted table will
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have just one column to store the encrypted values). However, as mentioned earlier, problems
occur when SQL queries must be executed over the encrypted data. The simplest solution to this
matter is to fetch the entire outsourced table and decrypt it, then execute the query. While this
approach can work well for small databases, it suffers from higher computation costs when applied
to larger databases (e.g., a table holding millions of records).
Researchers have proposed numerous solutions to avoid retrieving entire outsourced
encrypted databases by classifying records into categories before proceeding to the encryption
process. The encrypted table will have an additional column(s) to store the category of the record.
By using these categories, the end-user is able to retrieve only part of the encrypted data. In
addition, the amount of fetched encrypted tuples is impacted by how data are categorized in the
cloud (i.e., the more data categories there are, the fewer data are fetched). To address the issue of
categorizing data, many authors (e.g., [18]–[20]) have proposed approaches to dividing attributes
into categories that can be used to query encrypted data. The techniques are based on dividing each
attribute into ranges. The main encrypted table in the cloud will then have additional attributes—
as many as the number of partitions among all attributes—to hold numeric values. The whole
record will then be encrypted as one block and stored as an attribute value in the cloud. The early
attempts technique was developed by [10], who proposed different techniques to execute relational
algebra operators over the encrypted records. Their solution assigned an identifier for each value
in the tuple, then used those identifiers to retrieve only encrypted records whose identifiers
matched the requested identifier. Nevertheless, there are several limitations to using such an
approach, including vulnerability to statistical attacks, as mentioned in [21], and heavy client-side
computation due to decrypting every retrieved record’s data (because all the fields of each record
are encrypted as one block). The authors in [22] proposed a system to build an index for the plain
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data, then encrypt each page of the index individually. To execute a query, the corresponding page
is loaded and decrypted. However, since all pages are encrypted with one key, the security of this
scheme is downgraded. In addition, the size of the index will continue to grow, which could impact
performance. To improve the security level, a unique encryption key could be used to encrypt each
page of the index. In [21], the researchers suggested building a B-tree index, maintained on the
client-side, over the plaintext data. In [23], the authors introduced a single values level encrypted
index and suggested splitting the index into sub-indexes, i.e., each sub-index is for encrypted
values using the same key in the column. The authors in [24] proposed a none–order-preserving
index for the encrypted database. This index does not require interaction with the user once the
query is submitted. The security of this scheme is higher than that of models based on orderpreserving indexes, which may be vulnerable to statistical attacks. Hahn et al. [25] propose a
system to join encrypted databases. The idea is based on applying a selection operation first, then
enforce the join over selected data. That only leaks the frequency of use and access patterns. This
method is interesting; however, the delay is high because of the asymmetric cryptosystem they
use.
In [2], Popa et al. developed CryptDB as the first practical system for executing Standard
Query Language (SQL) queries over encrypted databases. Two attack scenarios were addressed
using onion layers encryption: cloud attack and proxy attack. Each datum is encrypted by more
than one encryption algorithm in which the outer layer ciphertexts produced by a randomized
encryption algorithm. CryptDB uses a proxy to perform the crypto operations for the user. One of
the drawbacks of CryptDB is that, because of the excessive crypto operations and many layers of
decryption, it introduces a high computational burden. In addition, because it is challenging to
execute an analytical load to encrypted data on a server, CryptDB was improved in [26] to support

11

complex queries and large data sets. MONOMI solves this problem by splitting the execution into
two sets: a set of queries to outsourced encrypted data and a set to be executed on decrypted data
on the user’s side. Authors in [27] proposed an enhanced version of CryptDB to accelerate query
processing. Instead of using AES, they used AES-NI, which was reflected in the speed of the query
processing time. They also suggested improvements to the hardware to accelerate query processing
in CryptDB. There are many different systems proposed on top of CryptDB, such as the one
presented in [28].
Liu et al. [29] proposed a fully homomorphic order-preserving encryption system (FHOPE)
to execute complex SQL queries over encrypted numeric data. This system allows cloud providers
to run arithmetic and comparison operators over encrypted data without repeating the encryption,
thus helping to resist homomorphic order-preserving attacks. The downside of that study is that
the authors conducted their experiments using tables with less than 9,000 records. For improved
measuarment of the efficiency and scalability of this system, the tables should have more records
(e.g., 100,000 or more). A variety of studies related to this system are provided in references [30]–
[34].
Cui et al. proposed P-McDb [35], a privacy-preserving search approach that allows users
to execute queries over encrypted data. To avoid inference attack, this system requires two cloud
servers, one for database re-randomizing and shuffling and one for data storing and searching.
Instead of a total search, P-McDb supports partial searches of encrypted records that are described
as a sub-linear manner. Further, P-McDb is a multi-user system. In the case of a user revocation,
the data cannot be re-encrypted. Another limitation of this system is that communication with two
cloud providers will add more latency when compared to other systems such as those described in
[2]. More proposed systems related to P-McDb are described in references [9], and [36]–[39].
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Osama et al., in [40], proposed different approaches for partitioning attributes of tables into
multiple sub-columns based on the attribute’s domain values. The methods were tested and
introduced various delays. They use an order-preserving mapping function, which enables cloud
servers to run different types of SQL-queries. The major disadvantage of this research is that only
attributes with numeric values but not with string values were considered. Moreover, such a system
only supports select statements.
In [41], the researchers proposed a secure database (SDB) approach, a system that divides
data into sensitive and non-sensitive, with only sensitive data being encrypted. The initial idea was
to split the sensitive data into two shares. The data owner (DO) keeps one share, and the second
share is kept by the cloud service provider (CSP). Assuming the CSP is curious, the CSP can learn
nothing from its share unless it obtains the DO’s share. Also, the SDB allows different operators
to share the same encryption, thus providing secure query processing with data interoperability.
Similar studies can be found in [26], [42], and [43].
As presented in [44], some researchers used a technique called “Bucketization,” in which
the tuples are mapped to more than one bucket. This technique enables a “database as a service”
(DAS) server to execute SQL-style queries over encrypted data. Each bucket contains a set of
encrypted records ranging from the minimum to maximum value and assigned an identification
(ID). Several studies based on this approach have been conducted [45]–[48].
Some researchers ([35], [49], [50]) have addressed cloud database privacy by adopting
what is called a hybrid cloud. The technique is based on dividing data into sensitive and nonsensitive. Then, the sensitive data or attributes are outsourced to the user’s private cloud while the
non-sensitive data are migrated to the public cloud. The problem is that, because most users
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consider their data to be sensitive, this scheme is not practical for users of non-sensitive data. Also,
the complexity of integration for this solution is high.
On the other hand, Amjad et al. [9] proposed a technique to prevent untrusted and
suspicious cloud service providers from being able to learn from private data. This technique is
based on vertical fragmentation, in which each sensitive encrypted column is outsourced to a
different cloud server (slave cloud). In contrast, while the whole encrypted table is stored at the
central server (master cloud). Because the encryption algorithms [2] and the proxy were used in
this system, the proxy performed all the work of interpreting queries, encryption, and decryption.
One of the limitations of this work is more communication delays, especially if the query condition
contains more than one clause. Another example of research that uses this technique is [51].
Bouganim et al. [52] introduced a hardware/software system to address the problem of
confidentiality leakage in the outsourced databases. The idea is that the user maintains and controls
a mediator smartcard that is plugged in on the side. This smartcard is responsible for encrypting
the data before putting them into the database and decrypting data before sending them to the user.
The major disadvantage of this technique is that the user is limited by the capacity of the smartcard
and cannot benefit from the storage provided by the cloud services. Similar studies can be found
in [52]–[54].
SafeBox [55] is a system based on an approach called access security broker (CASB). This
approach allows users to search and share encrypted data while protecting sensitive information
from being leaked if an attacker gains access to the cloud server (CS). This technique can be
applied over encrypted databases or files and supports keyword-based searches within the
encrypted contents. Several studies that use CASB can be found in [56] and [57]. Also, a detailed
survey about the use of brokers in the Cloud can be found in [58].
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3
3.1

Methodology
Introduction

The primary goal of this research is to address the significant drawbacks of some of the state-ofthe-art research in the field of cloud database security. They are described below.
Onion layers encryption means encrypting each datum using different encryption
algorithms. The inner layer is the ciphertext of the algorithm with the lowest security level, while
the outer layer is the ciphertext of the algorithm with the highest security level (i.e., randomized
encryption algorithm) [2]. When it comes to search for a value, the whole column’s values must
be updated to the next layer (take off layers) This process might be executed more than once to
achieve the desired result. For a large encrypted table, more excessive crypto operations are
performed, leading to substantial computational overhead. To enable the cloud server to remove
and adjust layers, the secret key is passed to the server, making the system vulnerable to an insession attack. Also, the trusted but curious cloud provider(s) could learn about the data if the
security layer is adjusted to a low-security level layer. To overcome this limitation, our proposed
approaches are designed to encrypt each datum in the table using only a randomized encryption
algorithm (AES-CBC). Also, we fetch only those encrypted rows from the cloud server that are
related to the query of the user, which reduces undesirable computations. We eliminate passing
the secret keys to the cloud server to ensure that curious cloud provider(s) cannot learn from the
outsourced database.
In systems that use vertical fragmentation (i.e., column-based fragmentation), the table is
fragmented throughout a multi-cloud. So, each column is outsourced to a different cloud to
preserve privacy and speed up the query processing [9]. This approach might be practical for tables
that have a few attributes but not for tables that have hundreds of attributes. The reason is because
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the table owner must have multiple accounts with more than one cloud server. If two or more cloud
providers collude, privacy will be compromised.
Communication delay is another concern when using such systems. To address this issue,
the developed systems require only one server to outsource the encrypted table, a feature that will
minimize communication costs, improve privacy, and accelerate query processing.
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a technique in which SQL queries can be executed over
the ciphertexts as if the data were not encrypted. HE is used to encrypt only numeric values and
support arithmetic operators over encrypted numeric data. However, the space required to store
the ciphertexts is too large. Also, the integrity of encrypted data is not preserved in such systems
because the attacker can change the ciphertexts undetected. To date, this type of encryption
supports only addition and multiplication over encrypted digital data. To overcome this, we use a
symmetric randomized algorithm AES-CBC to preserve integrity because the modification of a
ciphertext leads to an incorrect decryption result.
3.2

Encryption Strategy

To provide privacy and a high level of security, all of our approaches used AES-CBC to encrypt
sensitive data. Only the query manager (QM) keeps and maintains the secret keys (SKs). We used
a symmetric algorithm rather than an asymmetric algorithm to gain a higher level of security and
faster crypto processing.
3.3

The Query Manager (QM)

In our work [59]–[61], we defined the query manager (QM) as a trusted server that resides in an
organization’s or company’s private cloud. It works as an intermediary between users and the
Cloud and is responsible for processing queries and encoding BVs for each table (we explain this
step in detail in the discussion of partitioning trees). Also, the proposed prototypes support
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individuals’ cases in which QM would be light software residing in the end user’s system. For an
organization, it performs the same functions as the QM server. While we assume that the user can
encrypt only columns that have sensitive data, the proposed approaches even support encrypting
all of a table’s attributes.
3.4

Partitioning Tree (PT)

As stated in our previous studies [59-61], the PT is the primary element of all proposed systems in
which the query is appropriately rewritten for execution by the cloud server. The owner of the
table participates in the construction of the PT by specifying which columns are sensitive and
should be encrypted. Then, the table owner defines the possible partitions for each column and
indicates whether the partitions are ranges of values or non-ranges of values. Thus, the values in
each column are partitioned into multi-partitions in which each partition includes a set of values.
Then, the QM builds the PT based on these specifications. As shown in Figure 3.1., the name of
the table is the root of the tree, and the second-level nodes are the sensitive columns that have to
be encrypted. Nodes in the third level, each of which is assigned an ID, represent the partitions of
all the sensitive columns.
Table 3.1 The Students Table
ID

Name

SSN

VisaType

Department

01

Alice

12701

J-1

MATH

02
03

Ryan
Mark

25678
46932

F-2
F-1

BUSN
CSCI

04

John

42213

J-2

PHYS
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Figure 3.1 An example of the partitioning tree (PT) of the students table (Table 3.1)

The second-level nodes are assigned a color of either white or gray. Gray nodes imply that the
partitions of the column are ranges of values (e.g., the Name column must have range partitions
based on the first letter of the name, while students Visa Type have non-range partitions, such as
F-1, F-2, etc.). The PT is stored locally in the QM. We encourage the data owner to define as many
as possible partitions for each SC, which can narrow the range of retrieved encrypted records from
the outsourced table and, in turn, increase the performance of the proposed systems, and achieve
faster query processing.
We are not concerned about memory consumption in our solutions because the sensitive
information in every row is encoded into bits (i.e., the smallest computation unit). Based on the
PT, this does not consume memory or searching time. In section 3.6, we explain in detail how and
where to store bit vectors in each proposed system. Algorithm 1 shows how the QM constructs the
PT of the students' table (Table 3.1) and Figure 3.1 shows the PT of the students’ table.
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Algorithm1: PT construction
1: Input: file.txt containing the name of the table, sensitive columns, and partitions.
2: Create a tree and add a node, represent the table name (TN), as the root of the tree.
3: Int Id=0
4: For each sensitive column SCi
5:
Nodei = TN.addchild (‘the name of the SCi’)
6:
If SCi contains range of values
7:
Nodei.AssignColor (‘Gray’)
8:
Else
9:
Nodei.AssignColor (‘White’)
10:
While (partitions! = null)
11:
Nodej = Nodei.addchild(‘partition value’)

3.5

Encoding Approach

The encoding process is an essential step in the proposed systems. The proposed scheme is used
to encode records’ sensitive data into bit vectors (BVs), which can be exploited to retrieve the
required encrypted records (i.e., candidate records for the user's query without the need for
decrypting data). The QM parses each record to get the names of the sensitive columns and their
values. It then uses the PT to encode the tuples before proceeding to the encryption process, to bit
vectors (BVs). Each bit position in the BV is mapped to a partition node from the third level nodes
(e.g., the first bit in the BV is mapped to the node having the ID =1). The encoding process is
accomplished as follows:
1) For each record Rj in the main table T, the QM creates a BV having a length equal to the
number of nodes in the third level of the corresponding PT. It then initializes all its bits to
zeroes (e.g., if the bit vector has 10 bits, the number of nodes at the third level of the PT is
10).
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2) For each record Rj, the bit bm that mapped to the partition node PNm under SCi is set to one
if the datum equals the values represented by PNm. Then, the QM assigns an index to the
newly created BV.
For the sake of clarity, the encoded BVs of the records in Table 3.1 are as follows:
1 <100100010010000>
2 <001010100001000>
3 <010101000100000>
4 <010100010000010>
Figure 3.2 The BVs of Records in Table 3.1

How and where to store the BVs differs for each proposed system. In section 3.6, for each
prototype, we present the details of how and where to store the BVs (i.e., either locally at the QM
or by migrating them to the cloud server). We also discuss the security and the potential threats in
each model and show how to solve them. Algorithm 2 delineates the process of the encoding step.

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

Algorithm 2: Encoding algorithm
Define a vector V
For each record Rj in Table T
Parse Rj to get the value(s) of the sensitive columns SCs
Define a bit vector BVj of length n where n = the number of nodes in the 3rd
level of the T
For each SCi in Rj
If value v = value of the nth sub-node of the SCi OR v ∈ value of the nth
sub-node of SCi
Set nth bit in BVj to 1
Else
Set nth bit in BVj to 0
End for
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3.6

Developed Prototypes

3.6.1 Bit Vectors as a Matrix (BVM)
In this section, we discuss the model that uses bit verctors as a matrix. Some passages, figures,
tables, and algorithms presented in subsections (3.6.1.1 and 3.6.1.2) have been quoted verbatim
from our published work in [59].
3.6.1.1 System Description
In this prototype, we store and process the BVs of each outsourced table locally at the QM. We
assume that the QM is a trusted server residing in either the end user’s machine as an application
or in the private cloud (Figure 3.3). Because the only thing outsourced in this prototype is the
encrypted table, the highest level of security is provided. The outsourced encrypted table preserves
the structure of the original table. However, we add a column (used as a foreign key) to store the
rows’ indices (during the encoding process, the QM assigns a unique index number to every
encrypted row and its BV). Further, we need these indices to fetch the encrypted records. To
process a query, the QM needs to load the BVs to the main memory from the hard disk drive
(HDD) and perform a rapid look-up to find which records are candidates for the user’s query.
Then, it pushes their indices into a list and rewrites the query to fetch any record whose index is
on the list. In the following sub-sections, we present the supported statements for the relational
algebraic operations.
3.6.1.2 Basic Operations
The basic operations in database applications are insert, select, update, alter, and delete
statements. We extended this prototype to support these operations, as explained below.
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Figure 3.3 BVM Architecture.
Insertion statements are straightforward. The QM receives the insert query, creates a new
BV for the newly inserted record, appends it to the corresponding bit vectors matrix (BVM), and
then encrypts sensitive data and sends it to the Cloud.
Select is an essential statement in all database applications. In our approach, it is also part
of the execution of other statements like update and delete. In the QM, the process of executing
the select statement algorithm is to check which of the following cases is applicable and then
enforce it.
Case 1: None of the column(s) in the query condition is sensitive, so they are not stored in
encrypted form in the Cloud. In this case, the QM directly searches and retrieves the data
corresponding to the query condition from the Cloud. For example, in Table 3.1, Figure 3.1, and
Figure 3.2, if the query condition is “WHERE ID = 03”, the QM retrieves the records directly
from the Cloud that satisfy this condition.
Case 2: All column(s) in the query condition are sensitive, so they are stored in encrypted
form in the Cloud. In this case, for each column that appears in the query condition, the QM
retrieves the indices of corresponding bit vector(s) (BVs) from the BVM. Then it performs logical
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AND/OR operations based on conditions among indexes returned for each column. For example,
if the query condition is “Name = Mark AND visa type = F1”, the QM will find any BV having
the bit that mapped to the node representing the values of the PD “Q-Z.” Because “Mark” belongs
to this group (i.e., PD “Q-Z”), any BV has the bit mapped to this partition is set to one will be
added to a list L[]. The QM will do the same for visa type, then perform the logical operation
AND between the two lists and rewrite the query accordingly to fetch the candidate records.

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:

14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:

Algorithm 3: select
Receive user query < Table name, List of columns {c1, c2, c3 …}, list of values {v1,
v2, v3 …}>
Check query columns used in search condition
CASE 1:
If none of columns mentioned in query is sensitive
Search the corresponding table in cloud
Return data.
CASE 2:
If each column Ci is sensitive
For each value v being searched for under column Ci
Search the column representing that domain value in PT then for each BVj
entry under domain value in Ci
If bit =1
Add the index of BVj to List Li [ ]
Define list F where F [ ] is the final list that contains the indices from the lists ( L1 [
], L2 [ ],…, Li [ ]) after performing AND or OR (based on query conditions)
operations between them.
Return F
Retrieve encrypted records from the cloud based on the list F [ ].
Decrypt and return data
CASE 3:
If mixed columns (Sensitive and Non-sensitive)
Do Case 1 AND Case 2
Remove duplication if found
Return data
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The update process is one of the functions provided by the QM. Through this function, the
user issues a query to update record(s). The QM identifies record(s) using our select algorithm.
Then based on the results of select algorithm, the QM issues a query to retrieve encrypted record(s)
from the Cloud, decrypts them to find the exact records that match the query conditions, and issues
a query to update the encrypted record and its BV. The steps are shown in Algorithm 4.

1:

Algorithm 4: update
Receive user query < Table name, List of columns {c1, c2, c3 …}, List of values {v1,
v2, v3 …}>

2:

Use search Algorithm (Algorithm 3) to find the candidate record(s)

3:
4:

Fetch the record(s) from the encrypted table
Decrypt and find the exact record(s)

5:

For each update value uv in record Rj

6:
7:

If uv falls under non-sensitive column
Update the old value with uv in the outsourced table

8:

If uv falls under a sensitive column SCi

9:

For each SCi in the update query

10:
11:
12:
13:

If the uv falls under a PD other than the previous PD
Set the bit that mapped to this PD to 1 and unset the
rest of bits that mapped to other PDs for this SCi..
Encrypted the updated values
Send data back to the cloud

The delete process is used to delete a record from a table. In this case, the QM uses the
search algorithm to find the candidate record(s), then removes the record(s) from the outsourced
encrypted table and deletes the corresponding BVs from the BVM. Algorithm 5 outlines the steps
in the deletion process.
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1:
2:
3:
3:

Algorithm 5: delete
Use Algorithm 3 (select algorithm) to find the required record.
Add the index of each fetched record satisfying the delete condition into list L [].
Generate a delete query to delete any record from the outsourced encrypted table its
index is in L [].
Delete the BVs of the deleted records from the corresponding BVM.

Alter is one of the fundamental operations in any database that allows users to drop/add
columns from/to relations. However, in this model, the QM first determines whether the dropped
or added column is a sensitive column. In the case of “drop,” the QM will look at the corresponding
partitioning tree (PT) and drop all partition nodes of the predecessor node that represents the
dropped column. It then deletes all bits mapped to the deleted nodes from the BVM. The QM then
forwards the alter query to the Cloud, which will execute the query to drop the encrypted column.
In the “add column” case, the QM asks the user if the column is sensitive. If it is sensitive, then it
will add it with its partitions to the PT after receiving information from the user.
3.6.1.3 Relational Algebra Operators
3.6.1.3.1 Join
Most current research in database security does not support the join operator because dealing with
encrypted databases it is not a straightforward task, especially if AES-CBC is the encryption
algorithm. The simple solution for such a task is to retrieve all encrypted tables from the Cloud
and perform the join operator after decrypting them. However, this is not the optimal choice when
it comes to massive tables. In this model, to avoid unnecessary computation, we need to move as
much of the join computation as possible to the cloud site without decrypting data, leaving minimal
work for the QM. To make BVM both practical and efficient in the join operator, we need to
consider the following cases for the join condition:
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1) The join condition has only non-sensitive columns.
2) The join condition involves only sensitive columns having limited distinct value partitions
such as USA visa types.
3) The join condition contains only sensitive columns that have range partitions such as salary.
4) The join condition has at least two of the previous cases. So, we design an algorithm to
enable the cloud provider to implement a join operator over encrypted tuples without
decrypting the encrypted attributes.
To solve the first case, in which the join condition involves only non-sensitive attributes (i.e.,
unencrypted attributes), the QM will first determine if the attributes are sensitive or not. If they are
non-sensitive, it will forward the query to the cloud database, which will implement the join query
and return the join result to the QM. The QM then decrypts the join result and removes duplication
if found. In the second case, the join condition contains only sensitive attributes that are not ranges
of values. In this case, the QM creates a list Li [ ] for every partition of the attribute mentioned in
the join condition, where Li [ ] will have the index of any record having its bit that mapped to
partition node i is set to 1, before searching the BVM. Then the QM will rewrite the query to join
all the tuples from both tables based on the indices of these lists. For example, there are two tables,
A and B, both having the same attributes: ID, name, rank, department, salary. Now, assume that
the query was to join them where A.rank = B.rank. Then let us say that the partition domains for
rank attributes are manager, secretary, and employee. Now, the QM will create three lists for each
table. The first list will contain the indices of the bit vectors in the corresponding BVM that have
their bits mapped to the PD “manager” set to 1. The second list will hold the indices that have the
bits mapped to the PD “secretary” set to 1, and the third list will contain the indices that have the
bits mapped to the PD “employee” set to 1. In the next step, the QM rewrites the query to join the
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tuples that have their indices in list Li [ ] from Table A with the tuples that have their indices in
list Li [ ] from Table B. In the third step, the Cloud will execute the query and return the result to
the QM, which will decrypt and remove any duplications before sending the result back to the
user.
In the third case, the join condition contains only sensitive columns that are ranges of values.
This case is similar to the second case. However, in this case, the mapping between joined
partitioning lists can be one too many. To illustrate this, consider Figure 3.4. Assume we want to
join tables A and B by equality of salary. The salary column in Table A has three PDs that are
[(10,000 to 20,000), (20,001 to 30,000), (30,001 to 40,000)], and the salary column has two PDs
that are [(10,000 to 25,000), (25,001 to 40,000)]. We need to make sure that the QM rewrites the
join query in a way that it maps the PDs from Table A to the corresponding PDs from Table B. To
do that, the QM will create n lists for each table where n is the number of PDs in the table that has
the fewest PDs in the joining column. So, in the above example, n =2 since Table B has the least
PDs. In the first list L1[ ] in table A, the QM adds indices with bits that represent PD1, or PD2 is
1. In the second list L2[ ] of table A, the QM adds indices with bits that represent PD2 or PD3 as
1. The following figure, Figure 3.4, shows how the PDs are mapped. The QM rewrites the query
before forwarding it to the Cloud. After getting the join result back from the Cloud for each tuple,
the QM decrypts only the encrypted column’s value (only the encrypted columns involved in the
join condition) and enforces the join condition. If the join condition is satisfied, the QM proceeds
to decrypt all of the tuple’s values before moving to the next tuple. If the join condition is not met,
the QM will not decrypt the entire tuple’s values and will move to the next tuple. We do so to
avoid unnecessary decryption processes for those tuples that do not meet the join condition. The
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Table A

Table B

Partitions of salary

Partitions of salary

10,000 to 20,000

10,000 to 25,000

20,001 to 30,000

25,001 to 40,000

30,001 to 40,000

Figure 3.4 An example of joining two tables by the equality of salary values

last case is when the join condition involves two or more of the previous cases. In that case, the
QM might rewrite the query. Algorithm 6 below shows how the QM performs the join.
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Algorithm 6: Join
Input: the QM Parses user’s query to get tables’ names, attributes, and values.
QM checks the PT of each table in the join and performs the following:
Case 1
If join column(s) is non-sensitive (not present in the PT) THEN
Forward the query to the cloud server (CS)
Define LinkedHashSet s
For every fetched record i
decrypt all values in i
push i to s
send s to the user
Case 2
If join column(s) is a sensitive AND not ranges, THEN
For each PDj under the node that represent a SCi in PT of Table x
Create a list Lxj [ ]
For each BV in BVMx
If the bit mapped to PDj is not 0
Push the BV’ index to Lxj [ ]
For each PDj under the node that represent a SCi in the PT of Table x1
If the value v of PDj of SCi from table x1 equals to the v of PDj of SCi from
Table x2
PDj of x1 ⋈ PDj of x2
Rewrite the query and send it to the cloud
Define LinkedHashSet s
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23:
For every fetched record i
24:
decrypt all values in i
25:
push i to s
26:
Send s to the user
27:
Case 3
28: If join column(s) is a sensitive AND ranges, THEN
29:
For each PDj under the node that represent the SCi in PT of Table x
30:
Create a list Lxj [ ]
31:
For each BV in BVMx
32:
If the bit mapped to PDj is not 0
33:
Push the BV’ index to Lxj [ ]
34:
For each PDj under the node that represent the SCi in PT of Table x1
35:
If the PDj of SCi from table x1 contains at least one value v where v ∈ PDj from
table x2
36:
PDj of x1 ⋈ PDj of x2
37:
Rewrite the query and send it to the cloud
38:
Define LinkedHashSet s
39:
For each fetched record i
40:
Decrypt only the join columns’ values
41:
If the join condition satisfied
42:
Decrypt the whole tuple’s values
43:
Push i to s
44:
Else
45:
Proceed to the next encrypted tuple
46:
Send s to the user
47:
Case 4
48: The query involves two or more of the above cases.

3.6.1.3.2 Union
Union is one of the widely used operations in database systems in which tuples from two or more
tables are merged. However, to execute a union operator, the number of attributes and datatype of
both tables must be compatible. Even though the union operation removes the duplication from
the union results, dealing with encrypted data complicates this step. To accomplish this, we could
enable the cloud server to execute the union operator over encrypted tables and then send the result
back to the QM. Doing so will move the union computation to the cloud server leaving only
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decryption and duplication removal to the QM. The QM will decrypt each tuple in the union result
set and add it into a LinkedHashSet as soon as it receives it from the Cloud. Note that both tables
must be encrypted with the same secret key to execute the union algorithm. Algorithm 7 delineates
the processes.

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
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8:

Algorithm 7: union
Forward the user’s query to the cloud server
Define a vector v
For each fetched record i in the union result set
Decrypt i
Add i to v
v.distinct()
Send v to the user.
v.clear()

3.6.1.3.3 Intersection
Intersection is the process of finding the common subset out of two or more sets. However,
executing intersection over encrypted databases is not easy without decrypting the data. If the
tables to be intersected have a large number of records, the user is going to add a significant
computational overhead by decrypting the whole set of the encrypted tuples from the intersected
tables before executing the intersection operator. As a result, we cannot benefit from the cloud
services because the computation is moved to the user’s side rather than on the cloud side. Some
of the previously proposed systems in [2], [9], [10] can process queries over encrypted databases
but will experience delays if the tables to be intersected have large numbers of tuples.
In this model, our goal is to move the computation as much as possible to the cloud side
while eliminating unnecessary decryption processes at the QM. Moreover, we want to execute the
intersection operator partially in the cloud database server leaving only the elimination of
duplication at the QM. In this way, we exploit the high computational speed provided by a cloud
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database server to accelerate the query processing time. We explain the simulation of intersection
as follows:
•

The user sends the query to the QM, which is going to parse it to remove the headers of
tables and columns.

•

If the intersect operation involves k columns out of n columns, where n denotes the total
number of columns in a table, the QM uses our join algorithm to join both tables by k columns and then rewrites the query. Otherwise, the QM chooses all SCs that are not in
ranges to join the tables using our join algorithm before rewriting the query.

•

The QM sends the translated query to the cloud database server, which will execute the
query and send back the join result to the QM.

•

Before returning the intersecting result to the user, the QM decrypts the encrypted join set
and pushes it to a hash list to remove duplicates, if found.

To illustrate the process, consider this example. Suppose we have two tables, A and B, and we
want to carry out an intersection between them. Assume both tables have the same columns and
the same PT as those shown in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5 An example of a PT for Table A and Table B.

The translation process of the intersection query is accomplished as follows:
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1:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 1st, 4th , and 7th positions are set to 1.

2:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 1st, 4th , and 8th positions are set to 1.
Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 1st, 4th , and 9th positions are set to 1.

3:

4:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 1st, 5th , and 7th positions are set to 1.

5:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 1st, 5th , and 8th positions are set to 1.

6:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 1st, 5th , and 9th positions are set to 1.

7:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 1st, 6th , and 7th positions are set to 1.

8:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 1st, 6th , and 8th positions are set to 1.

9:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 1st, 6th , and 9th positions are set to 1.

10:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 2nd, 4th , and 7th positions are set to 1.

11:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 2nd, 4th , and 8th positions are set to 1.

12:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 2nd, 4th , and 9th positions are set to 1.

13:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 2nd, 5th , and 7th positions are set to 1.

14:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 2nd, 5th , and 8th positions are set to 1.

15:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 2nd, 5th , and 9th positions are set to 1.

16:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 2nd, 6th , and 7th positions are set to 1.

17:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 2nd, 6th , and 8th positions are set to 1.
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18:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 2nd, 6th, and 9th positions are set to 1.

19:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 3rd, 4th , and 7th positions are set to 1.
Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 3rd, 4th , and 8th positions are set to 1.

20:

21:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 3rd, 4th , and 9th positions are set to 1.

22:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 3rd, 5th, and 7th positions are set to 1.

23:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 3rd, 5th , and 8th positions are set to 1.

24:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 3rd, 5th , and 9th positions are set to 1.

25:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 3rd, 6th , and 7th positions are set to 1.

26:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 3rd, 6th , and 8th positions are set to 1.

27:

Join any record from table A with any record from table B if and only if the BVs of both records have
the 3rd, 6th, and 9th positions are set to 1.

3.6.1.3.4 Difference
To execute the difference in this prototype, the intersection is first enforced between the tables to
find the common tuples. Second, the QM sends a query to retrieve all tuples except the join result
set. Third, the QM decrypts the result and sends back the result.
3.6.1.3.5 Duplication Removal
Enforcing duplication removal over a query result (encrypted tuples) at the Cloud is impossible
because we use a non-deterministic encryption algorithm (AES-CBC). Therefore, we leave the
execution of this operator to be accomplished at the QM before sending back the user’s result.
That means the QM will decrypt the encrypted tuples retrieved from the Cloud. If the query
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contains the duplication elimination keyword “distinct,” the QM will define a LinkedHashSet data
structure that does not allow duplicated elements in the set. It will then add each decrypted tuple
to the set. Note that the translated query to be executed by the cloud server will not have the
“distinct” keyword. Further, the keyword “distinct” usually appears in select queries, in which case
the algorithm to eliminate duplication is the select algorithm, and we add three more steps to
execute the distinct operator. See algorithm 8 below.

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:

Algorithm 8: duplication removal
execute steps 1-9 of select algorithm
if distinct keyword is present in the original query
define LinkedHashSet s
for each fetched tuple i
decrypt values of i
push i to s
send s to the user.

3.6.1.3.6 Aggregation and Sort
To implement the aggregation and sort operators (max, min, and count) over encrypted tables in
the Cloud, we consider two cases for sensitive columns, ranges, and non-range columns. In nonrange columns, we can process the query locally at the QM with no need to communicate with the
Cloud. In such a case, we avoid the decryption computation that results from retrieving encrypted
records from the Cloud. Consequently, we will achieve faster query processing. Specifically, the
QM searches the BVM after looking up the corresponding PT using our search algorithm to obtain
a list of all BVs’ indices that satisfy the query condition. Note that the QM might not need to do
further computations such as decryption processes and will, therefore, send the query result back
to the user. For the sake of clarity, consider Table 3.1, Figure 3.1, and Figure 3.2, suppose a user
send the following query:
select count(name) from students where department = ‘computer science’;
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then, the query is processed as below:
•

The QM will search the PT and find that Dept is a non-range column (node’s color is gray).
Then it will search the BVM (Figure 3.2) and push the index of any BV having the bit
representing the PD “computer science” is not zero into a list L [].

•

The QM counts the number of the elements in L [] and returns the number to the user.

On the other hand, the query process is divided into two phases. The first phase is accomplished
at the QM, while the second phase is handled in the Cloud. The QM executes the aggregation or
sort operators over decrypted records after the QM processes the query to retrieve only candidate
encrypted tuples that are related to the query. For example, the query
Select count (‘name’) from student where the name =’Alice’;
is processed as follows:
•

The QM looks up the PT and will find the name is a range column (node’s color is not
gray). It will then search the corresponding BVM and add to the list L [] the indices of all
BVs that have the bit assigned to the PD “A-F” is one.

•

The QM then looks for any encrypted record in which its index is present in L[] from the
Cloud using this query syntax:
select name from the student where index in (“elements of L [] separated by commas “).

•

The QM decrypts every fetched tuple’s name and increments the count value only if the
decrypted name value equals ‘Alice.’

•

The QM returns the value of the count variable to the user.

The SUM and AVERAGE functions are processed similarly as a count, but we sum the decrypted
numbers. If the operation is average, we divide the sum over the number of decrypted values that
meets the query conditions. The sorting operator can be executed similarly to the aggregation
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operator. However, we need to run the sort operator over decrypted data before sending the result
back to the user. Algorithm 9 shows the process.

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:
18:
19:
20:
21:
22:
23:
24:
25:
26:
27:
28:
29:
30:
31:
32:
33:
34:
35:

Algorithm 9: aggregate functions
Do steps 1 to 6 of select algorithm.
If all SCs are non-ranges
If the operator is count
Do steps 9 to 12 of select algorithm
Let x = Count the number of Li []
Return x
If the operator is max
Let m = the value of right most PD of the SC predecessor node in the PT
Return m
If the operator is min
Let n = the value of left most PD of the SC predecessor node in the PT
Return n
If all SCs are ranges
If the operator is count
Do steps 9 to 15 of select algorithm
Define List Lk[]
For each fetched record i
Decrypt i
If i meets the query condition
Add it to Lk []
Return size of Lk [] to the user.
If the operator is max
For the right most PD of the SC
Do steps 10 to 15 of select algorithm
Define a variable x
For each fetched record i
Decrypt i
If i > x then
x= i
Return x to the user
If the operator is min
For the left most PD of the SC
Do steps 10 to 15 of select algorithm
Define a variable x
For each fetched record i
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36:
37:
38:
39:

Decrypt i
If i < x then
x= i
Return x to the user.

3.6.1.3.7 Project
In project queries, the QM does a column-based retrieval; it will select all tuples for specific
column(s). Further, we do not need to perform a PT lookup in the project. However, we need to
decrypt the whole set of retrieved tuples at the QM. We do not need to remove duplication of doing
any filtration at the QM.
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3.6.2 Bit Vectors as Column(n) (BVSAC)
In this section, we discuss the model that stores bit verctors as an additional column in the main
encrypted table. Some passages, figures, tables, and algorithms presented in this section have been
quoted verbatim from our published work in [60].
3.6.2.1

System Description

We designed this model to execute different relational algebraic queries over encrypted data. In
addition, we divided the computation into two sides: a client-side and cloud provider (CP) side, in
which we shift the majority of the computation to the CP site by rewriting the queries into ways
that enable the CP to execute them over encrypted data. The architecture of this model is shown
in Figure 3.6. We developed an algorithm for each query category (e.g., select, join, union,
intersection, etc.) to allow the CPs to execute such query categories over encrypted tuples. We
used our encoding scheme, presented in section 3.5, to create BVs. However, instead of storing
the BVs locally at the QM, we migrated them to the CP. On the CP side, the encrypted table

Figure 3.6 BVSAC Architecture.
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contains an additional column (reference column) to store a BV for each tuple. The data in the
reference column is a BIT(n), where n is the number of bits. We are not concerned about the growth
of the BVs because they are in bits stored in the Cloud. Because the maximum number of bits that
can be stored in an attribute of type BIT is 64 bits, we need more than one attribute to store bits.
Later, when it comes to translating the query, the QM can take the bits position and find the
remainder of the modulo 64. So, when the bit position is 91, then 91 mod 64 =27, which implies
that the new bit is located in the second bit’s attributes at position 27.
Even though it is difficult for an adversary to infer the data distribution or the possible
values of a column from the BVs, we encrypt the tables’ names and the headers’ sensitive columns
using a deterministic encryption algorithm (AES) in which the ciphertexts for each plaintext are
always identical. For example, the attribute “Students-Rank” contains a limited range of values
like senior, grad, junior, etc. An attacker might be able to infer possible values, although they are
randomly encrypted with AES-CBC (which always produces different ciphertexts for a plaintext).
Having more than one ciphertext share the same prefix is not a concern because the adversary
cannot get the plaintext unless he obtains the secrete key (sk). In this case, the sk is not passed to
the cloud server.
For example, we want to encrypt the table of graduate students, as shown in Table 3.2. Using the
owner’s sk, the QM encrypts the table name and the names of sensitive columns using AES-DET.
It then creates a new table at the cloud server. Using the PT presented in Figure 3.7 and our
encoding algorithm described in section 3.5, the QM encodes the tuples into bit vectors (BVs).
The outsourced encrypted table is similar to Table 3.3. Note that the encrypted table has an index
column in which each index number is a part of each row’s initialization vector (iv)). To show
how a query is processed using this system, assume a user submits the following query:
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Table 3.2 Graduate students
ID
110
111
112
113

Name
Alice
Sara
John
Ryan

Rank
Visa type
freshman
F1
senior
J1
junior
None
Sophomore
J2

Department
Computer science
Computer engineering
Information system
Math

“select name from Graduate_students where Department = “Computer Science”
The QM handles the query as follows:
1) The QM encrypts the name of the table and the sensitive columns’ headers using the sk of
the table’s owner and obtains the ciphertexts as below:
CTA = EAES-DET (“Graduate students”, sk)
CTB = EAES-DET (“Name”, sk)
2) The QM searches the PT to find the bits’ positions, then rewrites the query as:
“select CTB from CTA where reference&32 > 0”
3) The cloud server returns only the encrypted tuples that have the bit at position 32 (25) = 1.

Figure 3.7 The PT of Table 3.2
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Table 3.3 The encrypted graduate students table
EAES-DET (“Graduate students”, sk), encrypted version of the outsourced graduate students table.
Note that the headers of the columns are encrypted using AES-DET where ctn= EAES-DET (“Name”,
sk), ctr= EAES- DET (“Rank”, sk), ctvt= EAES- DET (“Visa type”, sk), ctd= EAES- DET (“Department”, SK).
Index
01
02
03
04

ID
110
111
112
113

ctn
*&^
%^&
)(#
$#!

ctr
*_^%
/+$
%$/*
!@~K

ctvt
*/d
&^/
+-*&
*/f

ctd
^%^H
&&%$
)*#R
@$%*

Reference
10001000010000100000
00010100000100010000
01000010000001001000
00100001000010000010

3.6.2.2 Condition Rewriting
To allow the cloud server (CS) to search encrypted data, the QM must rewrite the query conditions
in ways that allow the CS to execute the queries over encrypted tables. This translation process is
a mandatory step before executing any query in any category. The QM rewrites the queries based
on the stored (PT) of the table(s) involved in the query. As in [10], there are three conditions:
1) A condition is containing a column and a value.
2) A condition is containing only columns.
3) Both 1 and 2.
In both Type 1 and Type 2, we have five possible operators {>, <, =, ≥, ≤ } while in Type 3, we
have three operators {V, ⌐, ꓥ}. In Type 1, the QM parses the query to get the table name, attribute
headers, and values. After that, the QM finds the bit’s positions that represent the PDi under which
value v falls. If the operation is “=,” the QM replaces values with its corresponding bit position. If
the operator is “≥” or “>,” the QM locates the positions of all PDs that are less than v. Hence, the
QM rewrites the query by replacing v with the positions separated by OR, removes ( “>” or “≥”),
and adds “=” instead. For example, we have a table T, and it has a salary column attribute
partitioned into three PDs as {(1000-5000), (5001-9000), and (9001-12000)}. Let us say that the
partitions are mapped to the 32, 16, and 8, respectively. Assume that the user sends a query to fetch
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any tuple in which “salary > 8000.” Then, the condition of the query after translation is “reference
&16=1 OR reference &8=1.” We address the operations (“≤” or “<”) in a similar way as with “>”
or” ≥.” However, we take the PDs ≤ v.
In Type 2, for every table involved in the condition, the QM identifies the bits’ positions
mapped to all PDs of the attributes A. If the operator is “ =,” the QM rewrites the query by
substituting the attributes’ headers with pairs of the PDs’ separated by the OR operation (pair1 ˅
pair2 ˅ pair3 …). For example, (PDi from attribute A, ꓥ PDi from attribute B, where PDi=PDj).
To illustrate this, review Table 3.2 and assume that we have another table called (students info
table), and both tables share the same PT as in Figure 3.8. Suppose the condition is “where
GraduateStudents.name = students_info.name”. Then, let us say that:
CTA= EAES-DET (“graduate students”, sk)
CTB = EAES-DET (“students_info”, sk)
Assuming that both tables were encrypted using the same sk, the translated query condition is as
follows:
“WHERE ((CTA.Reference&524288>0 AND CTB.Reference&262144>0) OR
(CTA.Reference&262144>0 AND CTB.Reference&131072>0) OR
(CTA.Reference&131072>0 AND CTB.Reference &65536>0) OR
(CTA.Reference&65536>0 AND CTB.Reference &32768>0))”
We follow the same procedures if the columns are numeric, and the operators are in {>, <, ≥,
≤}. In Type 3, each condition can be one or more of the above two types separated by AND/ OR
logical operators.

42

3.6.2.3 Basic Operations
Insert statements, as in the previous model, enable this model to insert encrypted record(s).
To perform the insertion, we follow the same steps in the BVM system. However, instead of
appending the BV to the BVs matrix locally at the QM, we insert it as a value for the reference
column.
Select statements execution in this model is accomplished as follows:
The QM gets the user’s query, rewrites it according to the tables’ PT, and sends the translated
select query to the cloud server (note that the QM translates the clauses that involve only sensitive
columns). Then, the cloud server executes the translated query and sends back the result (encrypted
tuples for all candidate records). Now, the QM decrypts and applies the selection operation to filter
unrelated data before returning the result to the user. We illustrated the process in the example in
the previous sub-section. Algorithm 10 outlines the steps to be performed by the QM to execute
the select statement.

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

Algorithm 10: select
Input < Table name, List of all columns, List of all data items di(s) >
If none of columns ci mentioned in the query are sensitive
Forward the query to CSP
Decrypt encrypted data
Send result back to the user
If all column(s) ci mentioned in the query are sensitive
For each data item di / value v being searched for under column ci
Find the bit’s position that mapped to the partition domain PD that di falls under
in the table’s PT.
Rewrite the query and substitute values by bits’ positions.
Send the translated query to CSP to retrieve candidate tuples (CTs)
Decrypt CTs then implement select again to filter out unrelated records.
Send result back to the user
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To execute update statements, we use the select algorithm that is presented in Algorithm
10 to fetch candidate encrypted records from the Cloud. Then, if the new updated value(s) belong
to a different partition domain, the QM finds the exact record(s) and sends an updated query to the
Cloud to update the encrypted record(s) and the bits.
In delete statements, the QM uses Algorithm 10 to obtain the encrypted records from the
Cloud. It then identifies the exact record(s) after decrypting the candidate records. Immediately, a
delete query is issued by the QM to the Cloud to delete the encrypted records.
The process for the alter query is similar to the first model. We use the partitioning tree
(PT) to determine whether or not a column is sensitive. If the column is sensitive, the QM will
identify the node and its children nodes. In other words, the QM finds the node numbers that
represent bits positions of the encrypted column. Then, the QM issues an alter query to delete the
bit positions from the reference column and the encrypted table. The QM then removes the node
of this column and its children nodes from the PT. If a sensitive column is added, the process is
reversed. The QM adds a node to the second level and adds its partitions as children nodes in the
third level. It will then add n bits where n equals the number of new children nodes added to the
reference column.
3.6.2.4 Relational Algebra Operators
3.6.2.4.1 Join
To enable the proposed model to support the join operator, we must consider different cases for
the join condition: 1) the join condition involves only non-sensitive columns, 2) the join condition
involves only sensitive columns that have limited distinct values, and 3) the join condition involves
sensitive columns that may have too many distinct values. The first case is straightforward because
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the QM is required only to forward the query to the cloud database server (CDBS). Then, it
decrypts the result and removes the duplication.
In the second case, the QM uses the data structure DSs of the tables in the join condition
to match the PDs of the tables. For example, we have two tables, T1 and T2. In Table T1, each PDj
under a sensitive column SCi is joined with each PDj under a sensitive column SCi in T2 if and
only if the PDj from T1 equals the PDj from T2. Note that the QM does this only for columns that
are involved in the join condition.
The third case is based on the range of PDs. If PDi has at least one common element, the
QM joins the PDs from both tables and ensures that each PDi of the SC from Table T1 is joined
with each PDi of the SC from Table T2. For example, assume the salary PDs in Tables T1 are [PD1
(10,000–15,000), PD2 (15,001–20,000), PD3 (20,001–25,000), and PD4 (25,001–30,000)], and in
T2 are [PD1 (10,000–20,000), and PD2 (20,001–30,000)]. The QM joins PD1 from Table T2 with
PD1, PD2 from Table T1 because PD1 of Table T2 contains elements from both PD1 and PD2 of
Table T1, and so on. The QM then rewrites the query and sends it to the Cloud. The Cloud returns
the join result to the QM, which decrypts only the columns involved in the join condition and
checks whether the plaintexts satisfy the join condition. The QM decrypts the whole tuple only if
the two values satisfy the join condition. Otherwise, the QM skips to the next tuple. We do so to
eliminate unnecessary decryption processes. The QM eliminates duplicates after decrypting the
whole result. Algorithm 11 shows the steps of the join operation.

1:
2:
3:
4:

5:

Algorithm 11: join
Input < Tables names, List of all columns, List of all data items di(s) >
If none of columns mentioned in the join condition are sensitive
Forward the query to CDBS
Decrypt encrypted data and Remove duplication
Send result back to the user
If all columns mentioned in the query are sensitive
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6:
7:

8:
9:

10:

11:
12:
13:

If the SCs have limited distinct values
Join the bit’s position of each partition domain PDi of a SCk from table Tm with
the equivalent PDi of a SCx from table Tn
If the SCs have range values
Join the bit’s position of each partition domain PDi of a SCk from table Tm with
each PDi of a SCx from table Tn if it has at least 1 common value.
Rewrite the query and substitute columns’ names by bits’ positions separated by
OR operation.
Send the translated query to CDBS to retrieve candidate tuples (CTs)
Decrypt CTs and remove duplication
Send result back to the user

3.6.2.4.2 Union
To process union queries, we follow the same processes presented in the previous system for BVM.
3.6.2.4.3 Intersection
The intersection operation uses the same two conditions as the union operation. However, instead
of retrieving all encrypted tuples of both tables, we extract only the tuples that are common to both
tables. We must simulate the intersection operation because it is impossible to apply it over
encrypted tuples. To do that, in the CDBS, we use the inner join between the two tables. The join
condition is based on PDs that are not ranges because range-based PDs return more candidate
tuples. The CDBS then executes a query to choose the tuples from Table A that exist in the join
result. After that, the CDBS returns the joining result to the QM, which eliminates duplicates after
the decryption process. For example, Table A and Table B have attributes (Name, Visa type,
Rank). Then we perform the inner join operation in which the condition is visa type = visa type
AND Rank= Rank). Note that, in the condition, we substitute the columns’ names with the
positions of the corresponding bits to enable the CDBS to execute the operation. This substitution
filters out too many uncommon tuples in the Cloud, resulting in fewer decryption operations by
the QM. Algorithm 8 illustrates that processes.
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Algorithm 12: intersection
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:

Input < Tables names>
Find all common sensitive columns that are not ranges between the tables
For each table Ti
Find bits’ positions of PDs
Initiates an inner join query where the joining condition is based on the equivalence
of the bits obtained from step 4 for each table.
Send the query to CDBS
Decrypt the result of join.
Implement distinct over decrypted data to Remove duplication
Send result back to the user

3.6.2.4.4 Difference
To invoke the difference operator, we follow the same procedures as in the BVM system.
3.6.2.4.5 Duplication Removal
To remove the duplication, we follow the same steps as the BVM system.
3.6.2.4.6 Aggregate and Sort
In this operation, we have two cases. First, the condition clause is based on column(s) in which its
partitions domain PD values are not ranges. In this case, the CDBS efficiently implements the
aggregation operation over encrypted data and sends back the result to the QM, which needs only
to decrypt the result and send it back to the user. Note that the QM may not implement the
aggregation operator again over the decrypted data because the candidate tuples retrieved from the
CDBS are the exact query result.
For example, consider Table 3.2, Table 3.3, and Figure 3.7. A query select count(*) from
GraduateStudents where department = “Computer science”; is translated to “select count(*) from
EAES-DET(“Graduate students”, SK) where reference &32 >0”. It returns only the number of tuples
that satisfy the condition because the condition is based on the partition domain “computer
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science” that is not a range of values. The second case is the condition clause, which is based on
column(s) in which its partitions domains’ values are ranges. In addition to the operations in the
first case, the QM implements the aggregation operator again over decrypted candidate tuples. The
reason is that candidate tuples have tuples unrelated to the query because the PDs are ranges. In
the normal operation, the whole calculation is done at the QM. However, we minimize the range
of encrypted records retrieved from the CDBS by only those that satisfy the condition clause of
the average query. Algorithm 13 illustrates these steps.

1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:

Algorithm 13: Aggregation operator
Input < Tables names, List of all columns, List of all data items di(s) >
If none of columns mentioned in the aggregation query are sensitive
Forward the query to CDBS
Decrypt encrypted data and Remove duplication
Send result back to the user
If all columns mentioned in the query are sensitive
Reconstruct the query by substituting data items/ values by the bits’ positions that
mapped to the PDs that contain data items.
Send the query to CDBS
If the SCs in the aggregation query are not ranges
Decrypt the result
Send result back to the user
If the SCs in the aggregation query are ranges
Decrypt the result
Execute aggregation operator again over the result
Send result back to the user

To enforce sort operators over encrypted data, we can first make the cloud server filters
out unrelated records according to the PDs of the PT. Then the QM decrypts the returned sorted
result from the Cloud and executes the sort operator over them again. The sorting computation
performed at the QM before returning the final result to the user and after retrieving candidate
tuples is significantly small because the CDBS sends back only those candidate records that fall
under a specific partition domain(s). However, the CDBS will return a group of records that are
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not sorted except by the partition domain. For example, to retrieve tuples that have an income
ranging from 50k to 60k, the cloud server returns all encrypted records that have income within
this range unsorted. Therefore, the QM sorts them after the decryption process.
3.6.2.4.7 Project
To execute the project operator, we follow the steps for the BVM system.
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3.6.3 Bit Vectors as an Independent Table (BVSIT)
In this section, we discuss the model that uses bit verctors as a separate table. Some passages,
figures, tables, and algorithms presented in subsections (3.6.3.1 and 3.6.3.2) have been quoted
verbatim from our published work in [61].
3.6.3.1 Model Description
In this prototype, we store the bit vectors (BVs) in an independent table in the cloud server. We
add an index column to both the encrypted table and the independent table (i.e., the bits table), in
which the index of each record in the encrypted table equals the index of the corresponding record
in the bits table. To ensure that the bits table does not leak any data from bits representations, we
encrypt the indices in the bits table to ensure that an attacker cannot determine what record in the
bits table is intended for the encrypted record x in the encrypted table. Furthermore, we perform
record-based shuffling in the bits table so that the records will not have the same order as the main
encrypted table. Figure 3.6 shows the architecture of the proposed model.
For security in the BVSIT, data in all sensitive columns are encrypted with a symmetric
encryption algorithm (AES-CBC). This version is a randomized encryption algorithm in which the
plaintexts have different ciphertexts. By doing this, we enforce maximum security and make this
model resistant to various attacks such as chosen plaintext attacks and inference attacks. In
addition, having the bits table stored in the Cloud without index encryption could lead to data
leakage and enable the attacker to identify which record in the bits table represents a specific
encrypted record in the main encrypted table(i.e., record linkage attack). The attacker could do this
by matching the indices in both tables. To avoid this scenario, we encrypt the index column in the
bits table using AES-DET and perform record-based shuffling in the bits table. This encryption
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Figure 3.9 BVSIT Architecture.

ensures that the attacker cannot infer which record in the bits table represents the encrypted record
x.
3.6.3.2 Basic Operations
Before explaining how to support basic SQL operations in this model, consider the employees’
table presented in Table 3.6. Given the PT (shown in Figure 3.10), the bits table is shown in Table
3.4, and the encrypted table is shown in Table 3.5.
In select statements, we use the PT to rewrite the select queries appropriately so that the
cloud server can execute SQL queries over the encrypted data with no need to modify the
functionality of the database system. Because the PT is stored locally in the QM, the QM will
conduct a quick lookup to determine whether the attributes in the select conditions are sensitive.
Then, the QM will issue two queries. The first query retrieves the encrypted indices of all candidate
tuples for the select query from the bits table. The second query retrieves the encrypted tuples
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Table 3.4 Bits table of Table 3.5

Table 3.5 Encrypted employees table

Index

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

CT(3)

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

CT(4)

0

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

CT(1)

1

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

CT(2)

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

Index
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Figure 3.10 The Partitioning Tree (PT) of the employees table.

Table 3.6 The employees' table
ID Name SSN
Rank
Salary
01 Alice 12701 Secretary 30,000
02 Ryan 25678 Admin 60,000
03 Mark 46932 Secretary 29,000
04 John 42213 Manager 55,000

(whose indices were decrypted after being retrieved from the previous query) from the encrypted
table. For clarity, consider Table 3.4, Table 3.5, and Figure 3.10 for the following query:
select name from employees where rank = “manager” or salary = “60,000”.
Then, the query is processed as follows:
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1) The QM uses the PT of the employee table to locate the nodes representing the partitions
under which the values fall (i.e., “manager” and “60,000”).
2) According to the PT, “manager” is mapped to the node of ID = 6, and “60,000” falls under
the values represented by the node ID = 12.
3) The query is translated to another query to select the index from the bits table, where “6” =
1 or “12” =1; this enables the CSP to return any index that has a value of 1 in either column
6 or column 12.
4) The QM will retrieve the encrypted indices (CT (4) and CT (2)) and decrypt them to obtain
the plain indices (2,4).
5) A new query is issued to retrieve the encrypted tuples from the main encrypted table. The
query is:
select name from encrypted_employees where index in (2,4).
6) The QM will decrypt the data and ensure that rank = “manager” and salary = ‘60,000’ before
returning the result to the user.
The same process is followed if the condition has either more or fewer clauses. As in step three,
the operation “AND” and “OR” remain unchanged in the query condition.
To make this model sufficiently flexible and practical for all types of users, insert is
enabled to support insert queries. Before the encryption process begins, the QM uses Algorithm 1
to encode the inserted record(s) to the bit vector(s). The insert query leads to the sending of two
insert queries to the Cloud, one to insert the encrypted record into the encrypted table and the other
to insert the bits in the bit vector into the independent bits table. To do the shuffling, the system
will occasionally and automatically retrieve the entire bits table, re-encrypt the indices, and
perform a column-based, then record-based, shuffling before outsourcing the table once again. The
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reason to re-encrypt the indices is that if they are not re-encrypted, the cloud provider can easily
find the recently inserted record(s).
In update queries, the QM determines if the new value is intended for a sensitive column
by conducting a lookup of the PT. The select rewriting method is used to accomplish this step so
that only the candidate-encrypted tuples of the update query are retrieved. Following this, the QM
finds the exact record(s) after the decryption process and issues two queries to update both tables
in the Cloud (i.e., the encrypted table and the bits table). For example, we want to update Mark’s
salary (the third record in Table I) to 50,000. The QM uses a select operation to retrieve Mark’s
record and finds that the new salary falls under the node “12” that is mapped to column “12” in
the bits table. The QM will then issue two queries to update the new salary (i.e., the ciphertext of
the new salary value) in the encrypted table and update the value of column “10” to 0 and column
“12” to 1.
For the delete query, the QM uses the select method described earlier to retrieve the
candidate-encrypted records from the Cloud, decrypt them, and then find the required record(s).
The query is processed as follows: 1) The QM sends a select query to obtain the encrypted indices
of the candidate records from the bits table that is outsourced to the Cloud. 2) The QM decrypts
the encrypted indices and issues another query to retrieve the encrypted tuples from the main
encrypted table; the query will be a select query based on the indices obtained from the first query.
3) The QM will decrypt the encrypted tuples and filter the tuples that are unrelated to the query.
4) The index of any record related to the delete query will be kept by the QM, which will then
issue two deletion queries, one to delete the record from the encrypted table and the other to delete
the corresponding record from the bits table.
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The alter query is applied in the following process. When deleting a column, we first search
the second level of the corresponding PT to determine whether the column is sensitive (this step
occurs locally at the QM). In essence, the query is forwarded to the Cloud if the column is nonsensitive. Otherwise, the QM finds the IDs of all children nodes (i.e., sub-nodes at level 3) of the
node that represents the sensitive column. Then, the node and its children nodes are deleted.
Following this, the QM issues a query to delete all columns that represent the deleted partitions
from the bits table in the Cloud. It then sends another query to delete the encrypted column from
the Cloud. Note that we do not focus on updating the IDs of the level-three nodes at the PT. We
can keep their IDs, and we eliminate any unnecessary computations that could result from updating
them. To add a column, we follow the same deleting procedure but in the opposite way. We add a
node at the second level of the PT and then add sub-nodes that represent the partition domains of
the column. The n columns are then added to the bits table at the Cloud where n = the number of
sub-nodes recently added to level three of the PT. We also add a column to the encrypted table to
store the encrypted data of the newly added column.
3.6.3.3 Relational Algebra Operations
3.6.3.3.1 Join
As with the BVM system, implementing join over encrypted data without decrypting data or
modifying the functionality of the DBMS is a difficult task, particularly in our case where we use
a randomized encryption algorithm to encrypt sensitive data. However, to enable the cloud
provider to execute join without decrypting the data, we developed a strategy to accomplish this
while leaving most of the computation to the Cloud. In the following section, we explain how we
process the join operator.
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The QM gets the join query and parses it to obtain the name of the tables and the sensitive columns.
Note that we have the same cases as the previous model. If the join condition involves only nonsensitive columns, the query is simply forwarded to the Cloud without any modification.
Otherwise, the QM must perform a quick search to the partitioning trees (PTs) of the tables
involved in the join query to find which partitions of the joining columns from both tables can be
joined. To accomplish that, the QM rewrites the join query in a way to enable the CP to join any
partition pi of the SC from Table A with any partition pj of the SC from Table B if and only if the
pi equals pj or has common elements with pj. We do not want to miss any record. However, we
want to eliminate any unrelated records from both tables. After that, the QM rewrites the query
accordingly to fetch the encrypted indices from the outsourced bits tables of the joined tables. The
QM then issues n queries where n is the total number of partitions in the joining SCs from both
tables. So, if the joining SC in Table A has three partitions and joining SC in Table B has five
partitions, the QM issues eight queries to the Cloud to retrieve the encrypted indices from the
corresponding bits tables. After that, the QM decrypts the encrypted indices retrieved by each
query and adds them to lists. Based on the lists obtained from the previous step, the final join query
is then formed to fetch the candidate encrypted tuples from the main encrypted tables and send it
to the cloud server.
For example, we want to joint two tables, A and B, by Visa Type. For simplicity, we assume
the two tables have the same PT and that the partitions of the Visa Type attribute are (F1, F2, J1,
J2). In the bits table of Table A, named BOA (bits of A), the columns that represent Visa Type
partitions are 5, 6, 7, and 8. In the bits table of Table B (named BOB), the columns are 2, 3, 4, and
5. To execute the join query, the following queries are sent to the Cloud to retrieve the encrypted
indices from bits tables:
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Select indx AS A from BOA where ‘5’ =1; Select indx AS B from BOB where ‘2’ =1.
Select indx AS C from BOA where ‘6’ =1; Select indx AS D from BOB where ‘3’ =1.
Select indx AS E from BOA where ‘7’ =1; Select indx AS F from BOB where ‘4’ =1.
Select indx AS C from BOA where ‘8’ =1; Select indx AS D from BOB where ‘5’ =1.
Note that we avoid the joining query (e.g., select BOA.indx AS A, BOB.indx AS B from BOA,
and BOB where BOA.5 = 1 & BOB.2= 1) because it will slow the process. Our goal is to speed
up the query processing time. However, to minimize the impact of the communication delay, we
can send all the queries together as one string (i.e., as one prepared statement) to the Cloud.
Therefore, the best way to achieve our goal (fast query processing) is by using the queries
presented above. After completing this step, the QM defines eight lists, each of which contains the
decrypted indices from a specific query (i.e., list 1 will have the decrypted indices retrieved from
A, list 2 will include indices from B, and so on). The QM then rewrites the query in the following
format:
SELECT A.Name, B.name from (A inner join B on (A.indx in (elements of list 1) and
B.indx in (element of list 2) OR A.indx in (elements of list 3) and B.indx in (element of list
4) OR A.indx in (elements of list 5) and B.indx in (element of list 6) OR A.indx in (elements
of list 7) and B.indx in (element of list 8));

After the join is completed in the Cloud, the QM decrypts the result (only decrypting the joining
columns and enforcing the condition, if satisfied; then proceeding to decrypt the remaining fields,
otherwise skipping to the next tuple). The QM then removes any duplication before sending the
result back to the user (using the same process followed in the previous two models).

57

3.6.3.3.2 Union
To implement the union operation between two or more tables, we need to fetch all encrypted
tuples from all the unionid encrypted tables, then decrypt them and apply the distinct operator to
remove the duplication. Note that we assume both tables were encrypted using the same secret key
(sk). We follow the same processes as in the previous model (BVM) using an algorithm similar to
that in the BVM model.
3.6.3.3.3 Intersection
The intersection operation is similar to the intersection operation in the BVM model. However, we
intersect the bits tables before proceeding to intersect the encrypted tables in the Cloud. We use
the join operation to simulate the intersection process and filter out uncommon tuples from the
tables involved in the intersection operation. We follow the same procedures used for the
intersection operation, as in the previous model.
3.6.3.3.4 Duplication Elimination, Aggregation Functions, and Project
These operators are treated similarly to those in the BVM model.
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4

Experiments and Evaluation

In the previous chapter, we explained in detail the proposed models, and for each model, we
presented the developed algorithms to execute different relational algebra operators. As stated
earlier, this dissertation aims to implement, evaluate, and compare the performance of the proposed
prototypes for different types of statements using various metrics (e.g., the execution delay of
queries, space requirements at both the QM and the cloud server, and the percentage of the
computation overhead at the QM versus at the cloud server).
Furthermore, we compare our proposed prototypes to three systems: CryptDB [2], the one
block-based technique (OBT; i.e., each row is encrypted as one block) [10], and the column-based
fragmentation technique (CBF; i.e., each sensitive column is migrated to a cloud; read [9] for more
details). In the discussion subsection, we make a comprehensive comparison between the proposed
systems and the competing systems used in the evaluation. In addition, we recommend which
model is suitable for single users and which model is ideal for multi-user systems after
investigating the results of all the models.
4.1

Experimental Setup

We used a PC with 6GB of RAM, 1TB HDD, and a Core i5 processor with 2.8 GHz to conduct all
the experiments for all the systems (BVM, BVSAC, BVSIT, OBT, CBF, and CryptDB). To
implement the functions of the QM in the proposed models, we used Java to simulate each task as
a java class or method. MySQL server was used on the user’s machine and we used Java Database
Connectivity (JDBC) as a connector from Java to the MySQL engine. All the experiments were
performed on the local machine; therefore, the communication delay variable was removed from
all the reported delays.
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We implemented the OBT and CBF because their implementations are not available online
unlike CryptDB, which is available for public use on GitHub [62]. While implementing the CBF,
we adopted the implementation in [63] to encrypt numerical values in a way that preserves the
order (OPE) and in [64] to support the additive homomorphic property. In our models, we used
the randomized version of the AES-CBC to encrypt sensitive data. In our systems, each tuple’s
data are transmitted to the encryptor class as soon as the encoding step has been accomplished.
The encryptor and decryptor classes call numerous cryptographic packages, including the
“javax.crypto” package offering the classes and interfaces for crypto tasks; more information can
be found in [65], and the table owner’s secret key (SK) and the pre-generated initialization vectors
(IVs) can be used to encrypt or decrypt each tuple (each tuple needs a unique IV as explained in
Chapter 3). The SK is 256 bits, and each IV is 128 bits (the IV size equals the block size in the
AES). To store the bit vectors (BVs), we stored them locally at the QM in the first model, and we
wrote them in a text file for future use (in the future, the QM just reads the BVs set from the file.txt
and loads them to the data structure). In the other two models, we migrated the set of BVs to the
cloud.
4.2

Datasets and Partitioning Tree

We randomly generated four tables. We defined a list of values for each attribute and let a java
program constructs tuples by randomly picking values from the lists. The sizes of the tables (i.e.,
the number of records) were 10k, 20k, 50k, and 100k records. We had 24 attributes in total for all
tables, and we considered all of them, except ID attributes, as sensitive attributes. In our study,
although we could use the proposed models with small tables, we focused on the large tables since
it is easier to test the penalties introduced by each scheme. Table 4.1 presents the structure of the
main tables. For each table, we created a table in the cloud according to the created algorithm for
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each model. We built a partitioning tree (PT) for all the tables based on Table 4.2. We generated
the tables so that they were fairly distributed to the PT. For example, for the attribute (Name), not
all the records were mapped to the first partition (node #1) under the name predecessor; instead,
approximately 33% of the records were mapped to the first node, 33% assigned to the second node,
and 34% assigned to the third node. We considered the same technique for the rest of the attribute
partitions.

Table 4.1 The structure of the original (plain) students' table
Name of the Attribute

Datatype

Storage Required (bytes)

ID

int

4

Name

varchar

20

SSN

int

4

Visa_Type

varchar

6

Salary

int

4

Department

varchar

20

Table 4.2 The sensitive attributes and the number of partitions for students table
Attribute

Sensitive?

ID

No

Number of
Partitions
0

Name

Yes

3

SSN

Yes

2

Visa_Type

Yes

4

Salary

Yes

5

Department

Yes

6

Total number of partitions
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20

4.3

Evaluation

The evaluation consisted of the following:
1) Testing and evaluating basic database operations (create, select, insert, update, and delete
statements) execution cost
2) Testing and evaluating aggregation operations (sum, average, count, max, and min)
execution cost
3) Testing and evaluating joining and setting operations (join, union, and intersection)
execution cost
4) Identifying space requirements for each system
For each part, we considered different factors that play a role in the efficiency, such as the
number of clauses in the query conditions, what the logic operation (AND/OR) is in the condition,
and what encrypted attributes to retrieve for the tuples. In the discussion, we explore the factors
that make the proposed models more efficient and what makes them inefficient. In addition, we
discuss the impact of the PT size on the efficiency of the proposed models.
4.3.1 Execution Delay Comparison
4.3.1.1 Original Database Encryption and Insert Statements
In the proposed models, the original database encryption step involves parsing records, generating
indices, building BVs, encrypting sensitive data, and inserting the encrypted data into the
encrypted table in the cloud server. In Table 4.3, we compare the time taken by each system to
encrypt each table. As seen in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1, the BVSAC experienced the least
encryption and insertion delays among all systems because the QM does not need to store nor
manage the BVs locally at the QM as in the BVM, which is why we see that the delay in the BVM
is higher than the BVSAC. The second fastest model is the OBT, which encrypts every tuple as
one block and adds M columns, where M is the number of sensitive columns, to store the integer
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values of the identifiers. On the other hand, the CBF experienced the highest delay since the
encryption process required N insertion (N = number of columns + 1) into N different tables in
different cloud servers. The second slowest model is CryptDB in both the creation and insertion
processes due to heavy computation results from the onion layer encryption. In summary, the
proposed models are faster than the CryptDB and CBF models in both the creation and insertion
processes.

Table 4.3 The delay of the original database encryption comparison among all systems in
minutes
N.R

BVM

BVSAC

BVSIT

CryptDB

CBF

OBT

10k

12

11

25

44

55

13

20k

26

23

48

66

112

24

50k

65

54

115

158

291

55

100k

147

112

223

308

578

113

ms
400
340

350
300
250

209

200

141

150
100

79

67

BVM

BVSAC

69

50

0
BVSIT

OBT

CBF

CryptDB

Figure 4.1 The delay comparison of insert statements for all systems, in milliseconds
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4.3.1.2 Basic Statements
In this section, we examine the delay in executing different basic statements (select, update, and
delete) for all systems. Furthermore, we focus more on the select statements because they are the
main operations in most database applications. In addition, most state-of-the-art research focuses
on select for the same reason.
4.3.1.2.1 Experiment 1
In this experiment, we calculated the average percentage of fetched encrypted tuples from the
encrypted tables for the proposed models. We also studied how the number of clauses in the query
condition can contribute to narrowing the range of the fetched set. Figure 4.2 illustrates how our
models dramatically drop the average retrieved encrypted candidate records for select statements
to about 31% when only one clause is present in the query condition, while all the models fetched
the least percentage when the condition clause had three clauses. On the other hand, without using
any of the proposed prototypes to manage the randomized encrypted database (i.e., no indexing),
we must retrieve the entire outsourced encrypted table.
Our approaches

No indexing

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
One Clause

Two Clauses

Three Clauses

Figure 4.2 The percentage of retrieved encrypted tuples for all proposed models
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4.3.1.2.2 Experiment 2
As mentioned in Chapter 3, we aimed to reduce the crypto computation at the QM when possible
to avoid computation overhead, which speeds up the query execution time. To accomplish this, we
only decrypted the column values that were present in the query condition before proceeding to
decrypt the encrypted values of the whole record. For the sake of clarity, we have, for example,
the following select statement:
select * from students WHERE name = ’Alice’
Using any of our proposed models, as depicted in Figure 4.3, we only fetch less than 35% of the
entire set of the outsourced encrypted records. This depends on how the name column was
partitioned beforehand; in our case, we had three partitions, and the more partitions that are
defined, the lower percentage we obtain and vice versa. However, we do not immediately decrypt
all the encrypted data of the fetched set. Instead, we decrypt only the name values to determine if
the name is equal to “Alice” (i.e., we start by decrypting the column mentioned in the query
condition). If the name equals “Alice,” then we decrypt the entire record; otherwise, we skip to the
next one and so on. In Figure 4.3, we can see that from the whole fetched encrypted set, the average
of the entirely decrypted rows was less than 24% of the fetched rows. Accordingly, our models are
efficient since we are not only narrowing the range of retrieved outsourced data, but we are also
eliminating the unnecessary computation (crypto computation) whenever possible.
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Figure 4.3 Average percent of entirely decrypted tuples

4.3.1.2.3 Experiment 3
4.3.1.2.3.1 Select (*) Latency
In this study, we focused on select statements since they are the widely used statements in the
database systems. As explained in the previous chapter, the select statement is also part of the most
proposed relational algebra algorithms (e.g., delete and update). Therefore, we deeply examined,
tested, and evaluated the select statements with a different number of clauses and both cases of
select single column values, such as, select name and select all (i.e., select *). Furthermore, as a
part of this experiment, we compared the performance of the proposed models against the
CryptDB, OBT, and CBF systems.
Table 4.4 presents the total runtime for all systems when executing select statements to
retrieve single column values. The runtime we measured was the time from query parsing until the
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final query result was formed in milliseconds (ms). In the first case, we measured the average
runtime when the condition clause of the queries features only one clause. The delay is the average
delay of executing a select statement on each sensitive column. Furthermore, we tested select *
statements when the condition had two and three clauses. Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5, and Figure 4.6
present the total execution time of select * statements for each model. As seen in the figures, the
BVSAC averaged the shortest runtime of all the proposed models for all cases (i.e., single clause
and multiple clauses) when the database sizes were 50k records or more. This result means that
the BVSAC performs better, in term of execution time, with larger databases and has a higher
start-up time than the other proposed models, which is why it is slower than some other systems
for processing databases with 20k and 10k. Another factor that speeds up query processing is that
we benefit from the bitwise operations, provided by MySQL, in the cloud because we store the
bits as an independent column along with each encrypted record. Furthermore, we eliminated the
manipulation of the indices at the QM in contrast to the BVM and BVSIT. For smaller databases
(10k or less), the BVSIT experienced the fastest execution time of the proposed systems because
the bitwise operations were performed in a column-based manner, allowing for rapid searching
over the bits table; however, when databases grew, the performance of the BVSIT downgraded as
the amount of the decrypted indices at the QM grew (i.e., the indices fetched from the bit table).
The BVM model is the second fastest for databases with more than 50k rows, and the main factor
that affects the performance of the BVM is the time for loading the BVs from the hard drive to the
main memory and then searching them. Forming the final lists of the candidate record indices is
another factor that affects the delay in this model.
In terms of comparing the proposed prototypes with the other approaches, as seen in Table
4.4, Figure 4.4, Figure 4.5, and Figure 4.6, the proposed models were faster than all the competing
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systems except for the OBT for select statements with two or three clauses. The OBT experienced
the least delay since the amount of decrypted data was less than in our approaches (all values are
stored as one block leading to fewer bytes to decrypt for each row). Cell-based encryption produces
longer ciphertexts (i.e., the blocks less than 16 bytes will be padded) and then higher decryption
overhead. However, when the select query is not to select all (select *), our models perform better
than the OBT because we eliminate decrypting whole rows in our models, whereas the OBT does
not. When the query condition involved a single clause, the CBF system experienced delays
comparable to our systems, but when the number of clauses in the select statements was two or
three, its delay was almost double that of our system’s delays since two or three tables are searched
to form the final select query (the query that retrieves the records from the main encrypted table in
the master cloud). Finally, the CryptDB incurs the highest delay among the systems as a result of
the decryption of the onion layers overhead. The delay also increases when the statement condition
has two or three clauses because more onion layers are required to be slipped off in different
columns.

Table 4.4 Delays in milliseconds of executing (select *).
The average required records are 8% for one clause, 5% for two clauses, and 3% for three
clauses.
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BVSIT
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CBF
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25000
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(a) Average total processing time for all models, including CryptDB.
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(b) Average total processing time for all models, excluding CryptDB.

Figure 4.4 The delay comparison of executing select all statements (select *) for all models
in ms when the query condition contains only one clause.
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(a) Average total processing time for all models, including CryptDB.
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(b) Average total processing time for all models, excluding CryptDB.

Figure 4.5 The delay comparison of executing select all statements (select *) for all models
in ms when the query condition contains two clauses.
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(b) Average total processing time for all models, excluding CryptDB.

Figure 4.6 The delay comparison of executing select all statements (select *) for all models
in ms when the query condition contains three clauses.
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4.3.1.2.3.2 Select (col) Latency
Table 4.5 presents the total query processing time of implementing select statements with one,
two, and three clauses in the WHERE condition to retrieve a single column’s values instead of
select *. To make a simpler comparison, in Figure 4.7, Figure 4.8, and Figure 4.9, we plotted the
numbers from Table 4.5. Examining the figures reveals that the performance of the proposed
models increased in the same order as implementing select *. However, our models tend to be
slower than the OBT for executing select * over different database sizes, but with single-column
selection, our models except the BVSIT beat the OBT when executed over different dataset sizes.
The BVSIT performs better than the OBT for the database of 20k or fewer records but not for more
extensive databases (i.e., 50k and 100k records) because the number of decrypted indices fetched
from the bits table grows, which adds more computation overhead to the QM.

Table 4.5 Delays in milliseconds of executing (select single column).
The average required records are 8% for one clause, 5% for two clauses, and 3% for three clauses.
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(a) Average total processing time for all models, including CryptDB.
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(a) Average total processing time for all models, excluding CryptDB.

Figure 4.7 The delay comparison of executing select statements to retrieve a single column’s
value for all models in ms when the query condition contains only one clause
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(b) Average total processing time for all models, excluding CryptDB.

Figure 4.8 The delay comparison of executing select statements to retrieve only one
column’s value for all models in ms when the query condition contains two clauses.
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(b) Average total processing time for all models, excluding CryptDB.

Figure 4.9 The delay comparison of executing select statements to retrieve only one
column’s value for all models in ms when the query condition contains three clauses.
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4.3.1.2.3.3 Throughput
Throughput is defined as the amount of data transferred at a given time. By measuring the
throughput, we can tell which system is more responsive to user’s queries when the requested data
are increased since the end user is the one who will be affected by the system slowdown. To
measure the throughput, we executed a set of queries to retrieve % 25 then %50 of the records
from a table holding 100,000 records. Then, we measure the amount of plain data (records’ data
after decryption) and divide it by the time taken by each system to deliver the required data to the
user [66].
n

Throughput =

∑k=0 unencrypted record′ s size (in bytes)
Total time taken to deliver the data (MS)

, where n= the total number of required

records.
As seen in Table 4.6, the proposed systems achieved a higher throughput when compared
with CryptDB and CBF systems. Further, BVSAC achieved a higher throughput among the
proposed systems in this research which makes it the best choice for end users who seek a faster
responsive system. OBT has the highest throughput and that is because it requires the least bytes
requirements among all systems to encrypt data.
In Figure 4.10, we show the percent of the throughput for each system and we compare the
systems with the throughput of MySQL when dealing with unencrypted data. To calculate the
percent, we multiply the system throughput by 100 and divide it by the unencrypted throughput.

Throughput percent =

System′s throughput ∗ 100
Unencrypted throughput

By examining Figure 4.10, we can say that our systems achieved a reasonable throughput
percent and as the amount of required data increased (up to 50% of the rows), the throughput
dropped slightly and still outperform CryptDB and CBF.
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Table 4.6 The amount of plain data in kB that each system can deliver to the user per
second.
kilobytes per second (kB/s)
Requested rows = 25%
Requested rows = 50%

BVM
794
971

BVSAC
1083
1221

BVSIT
778
947

OBT
1440
1447

CBF
727
816

CryptDB
66
57

MySql
4720
10114
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Percent Throughput
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0.0
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Requsted rows = 25%
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CBF
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Unencrypted

Figure 4.10 The percent of throughput of all systems compared with the throughput of
MySQL when requesting unencrypted data. Note, the requested data are fetched by a select
query from a table with 100,000 records.

4.3.1.2.4 Experiment 4: Update and Delete Statements
Figure 4.11 depicts the average time cost taken by each system to execute update statements. In
this experiment, we executed update statements with only one predicate. As seen in Figure 4.11,
the update time cost is high in all systems and is the result of updating an encrypted field in the
database systems. The x-axis represents the number of rows affected by the update statements,
77

which means selecting the required data and then issuing 100 insert statements in the first case,
200 insert statements in the second, and so on. The BVSAC and OBT systems have a close update
delay, 6,812 and 7,130 ms, respectively. However, in the OBT, the update process is risky when
two or more substrings in the decrypted block match the updated value (i.e., any substring from
the updated record that matches the new substring will be updated to the new substring). Thus,
update in the OBT is not recommended. By zooming to the delays of the proposed models, the
BVSIT is the slowest system because the update must be done in both the main encrypted table
and the bits table, and it is the second slowest model. In addition, the BVM experienced a slightly
higher delay than the BVSAC but still performed faster than the CBF, which is the third slowest
model in this comparison. In CryptDB, the update cost is the highest of the compared systems. In
summary, the BVSAC is the most efficient model for update statements.
Figure 4.12 demonstrates the time taken by each model to delete different numbers of
records (100, 200, 500, and 1,000 tuples) when the delete condition has only one clause. The delete
process selects the required rows and then deletes them. The delete is efficient in all the proposed
models because the delete is performed after executing the select operation to retrieve the needed
tuples. Instead of sending a single query to delete each record, we maintain the index of the record
and then issue one query at the end to delete any record of its index in the delete query, that is,
delete from TABLE_NAME where index in ( ). On the other hand, CryptDB is the slowest system
to execute delete statements for the same reasons we mentioned earlier (i.e., onion layers
decryption).
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Figure 4.11 Comparison of the average delay of update statements for all models to
update a number of existing tuples (100, 200, 500, and 1,000 tuples).
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Figure 4.12 Comparison of the average delay of delete statements for all models to
delete a different number of tuples (100, 200, 500, and 1,000 tuples).
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4.3.1.1 Aggregation Functions
4.3.1.1.1 Experiment 5
Table 4.7 and Table 4.8 list the average execution times of the aggregation operators’ (sum,
average, count, max, and min) queries for the proposed prototypes along with the competing
systems. All the aggregate queries executed in this comparison have one predicate (i.e., we did not
execute the aggregate functions on the entire column’s values), and the average number of records
that meet the aggregate condition in all the queries is approximately 6%. The cost resulted from
the aggregate functions relying on the cost of select statements in the proposed models because
first, the query is rewritten to fetch the required rows (e.g., “select rows where department =
Business”), then while decrypting the result, the QM enforces the aggregate function if the query
condition is met (refer to the aggregate algorithms of the proposed systems in Chapter 3). In the
OBT system, the procedures we followed in the proposed systems were followed, but the whole
encrypted rows were fetched, which results in heavier computation overhead at the QM. In the
CBF and CryptDB, the encryption algorithm used to encrypt the numerical field to support the
addition operation over the encrypted values is homomorphic encryption (i.e., the Paillier
algorithm). The Paillier algorithm relies on multiplying the modular to produce the encrypted sum,
which requires heavier computation than the proposed models. In the implementation of the CBF,
we adopted the Paillier algorithm in [64] to encrypt the extended salary column; however, to
execute the aggregate function, the indices of the rows in column A that meet the aggregate
condition must first be retrieved from the corresponding table at cloud x that maintains the
extended column A. Then, the aggregate query was rewritten to apply the aggregate function over
the encrypted values of the records that their indices are in the query predicate. From both tables
(Table 4.7 and Table 4.8), we can conclude that the proposed models achieved a faster execution
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delay than the others for smaller databases, but for larger databases, the BVSAC is the winner,
while the BVSIT starts to experience heavier computations, as stated in the previous experiment.
CryptDB is the slowest model in all database sizes due to the intensive decryption operations.

Table 4.7 Delay comparison in milliseconds of executing SUM, AVERAGE, AND COUNT
functions. (only one predicate in the queries)

Table 4.8 Delay comparison in milliseconds of executing MAX and MIN functions. (only
one predicate in the queries)
Average delay of MAX and MIN
10k
20k
50k
100k

BVM
112
201
447
741

BVSAC
123
217
311
468

BVSIT
109
237
480
858

OBT
208
289
532
815

CBF
147
208
363
647

CryptDB
878
1714
10762
20185

4.3.1.2 Join, Union, and Intersection
4.3.1.2.1 Experiment 6
In this study, we compared the delay of the proposed prototypes for join and union queries. In join
queries, we did not include the competing systems in this experiment because the join has not been
implemented in CryptDB (as the author stated in [62]) and the CBF. Therefore, we excluded all
the competing systems from this experiment, and we performed the experiment on tables with the
specifications displayed in Table 4.9.
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Table 4.9 Specifications of the joined tables
Table size (number Number of rows matching
of rows)
the join condition
500
100
1000
200
10000
1000

We joined two tables by the equality of the encrypted ID, and their structures are in Table
4.11 and Table 4.10 below. The ID column in both tables is partitioned into 10 partitions based on
the last digit in the ID as (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9). Figure 4.13 demonstrates that the delay of
the BVSAC is the highest, followed by the BVSIT, and the BVM has the least delay. The high
delays in the join queries in all the proposed models are due to the nature of the join calculation
and the amount of the decrypted data. Then, after enforcing the join condition (at the QM), the
decrypted tuples were pushed into a LinkedHashSet to remove the duplication. In conclusion,
although we experienced high join delays, we executed the join statements using the proposed
systems over databases that were encrypted with a randomized encryption algorithm, such as AESCBC.
Figure 4.14 demonstrates the average total time of processing the union queries of all the
proposed systems. In all the proposed prototypes, the QM intercepts the union query and forwards
it to the server without modification. Therefore, the cost presented in Figure 4.14 is the average
delay of processing the union statements taken by all the models (we took the average execution
time of all the systems since the delay of the union queries is roughly close for all the models).
The delay we measured is from the time the QM intercepts the query until the final query result is
formed. To remove the duplications, we pushed the decrypted tuples from both tables to a
LinkedHashSet, which ensures no duplicated records exist. As seen in Figure 4.14, our models
experienced a linear delay growth as the sizes of the tables increased.
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In Figure 4.15, we show the latency, in milliseconds, of the intersection operator when
executed on different tables with a different number of records. To perform this experiment, we
reduced the tables’ sizes because we experienced execution failures due to the lake of memory.
Moreover, the leading cause to get this kind of error is the massive join computations that result
from implementing the intersection operator. Note that the intersection queries were to intersecting
tables based on all columns (i.e., not a partial intersection). As seen in Figure 4.15, The BVM
system is the most efficient in performing the interaction, while the BVSAC is the least efficient
in terms of latency. The factors that cause the variation in the delay are the same factors that affect
delays in join queries.
Table 4.10 The structure of original international students
table
Name of the
Is
Data type
Attribute
sensitive?
ID
int
Yes
Name

varchar

Yes

Address

int

Yes

Citizenship

varchar

Yes

Table 4.11 The structure of TA students table.
Name of the
Attribute
ID

int

Is
sensitive?
Yes

Name

varchar

Yes

SSN

int

Yes

Visa_Type

varchar

Yes

Salary

int

Yes

Department

varchar

Yes

Data type
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Figure 4.13 Join delay comparison among the proposed systems
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Figure 4.14 Union delay comparison among the proposed systems
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Figure 4.15 Intersection latency comparison among the proposed systems

4.3.1.3 Query Rewriting at the QM
4.3.1.3.1 Experiment 7
Figure 4.16 depicts the average time taken by each model to rewrite a query. The processes
required to rewrite a query are presented in Table 4.12.
Table 4.12 Query rewriting stages

BVM
BVSAC
BVSIT

Query parsing

PT search

✔
✔
✔

✔
✔
✔
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BVs store and
search (at QM)
✔
x
x

Indices
decryption
x
x
✔

To calculate the average, we executed a set of queries for different cases of select statements with
one, two, and three clauses. We focused on the select statements because they are part of the update
and delete statements, so examining the select statement is enough to measure the cost of
translating queries in each model; we excluded the crypto operations from this percentage.
In Figure 4.16, the pie chart represents the total average delay taken by all the proposed
prototypes in translating a query. According to this chart, the BVM has the largest portion of delay
(about 52%), followed by BVSIT (about 38%), leaving only 10 % of the total cost to the BVSAC.
The BVM presents the highest percentage because of the BV preparation and processing.
Afterward, the QM needs to prepare a list containing the indices of the candidate records to be
fetched from the cloud. This step is mandatory before the translation process. In the BVSIT,
although the QM does not maintain the BVs, which we migrated to the cloud, the main reason for
the delay is the decryption processes of the fetched BV indices. Another factor contributing to this
delay is that the QM must communicate twice with the MySQL engine to process a query. In the
BVSAC, the QM searches the PT then rewrites the query; therefore, it has the least delay
percentage.

BVSIT
38%
BVM
52%

BVSAC
10%
BVM

BVSAC

BVSIT

Figure 4.16 The average query translation cost at the QM for each model
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4.3.1.4 Cloud Server Computation versus QM Computation
Figure 4.17 illustrates the average percentage of the computation time at the QM compared to the
server when a query is executed by the proposed prototypes and by the other systems. The figure
demonstrates that the CryptDB has succeeded in moving over 90% of the query processing
computation delay to the server, leaving less than 10% of the computation delay to the QM (the
QM is equivalent to the proxy in both the CryptDB and CBF). Despite this, the penalty is the
higher query processing delay, as demonstrated in the previous experiments.
In our proposed prototypes, we can see that BVM has most of the computation overhead
at the QM because in addition to the crypto operation, the BVs are processed locally at the QM.
About 60% of the computation is at the QM in the BVSIT due to decrypting the BVs’ encrypted
indices after fetching them from the server. The OBT has about 53% of the computation at the QM
because the QM is entirely decrypting the fetched records, even for queries not based on select *
statements.
On the other hand, the BVSAC and CBF experienced a close percentage of overhead at the
QM and cloud (about 50% of the computation moved to the server) because in the BVSAC, the
BVs are searched at the server, and we avoid processing them at the QM, as explained earlier.
Furthermore, in the CBF, the arrangements of different sets of indices and the rewriting of the
query after performing conjunctive operations between the set of indices are the leading causes of
obtaining a higher computation percentage at the QM.
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Figure 4.17 The percentage of the computation at the QM versus at the cloud server

4.3.2 Space Requirement
In this section, we evaluate each system in terms of the space requirement at both the cloud server
and the QM as, for the proposed systems, a system could require not only space to store the
encrypted table at the server but also space to maintain the BVs. In Table 4.13, for each proposed
model (BVM, BVSAC, and BVSIT), we present the total space required for each record at the
server in bytes. The index column is an integer that required 4 bytes, while the rest of the columns
(the columns that will be encrypted) required 33 bytes (32 bytes since the secret key is 32 bytes +
1 byte to record the datatype length [67]. In addition, we present the space required to store the
BVs on the server for each model. In the same table, we present the storage requirement per row
for the OBT, CBF, and CryptDB. For the OBT scheme, all the values are stored as one block in
one column; however, a column (datatype of int) is still required for the identifier of each sensitive
column in the main table. In total, there are six columns in the plain table, which require six
columns for identifiers. In the CBF, each numerical column (i.e., at the extended table in the salve
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server) needs 257 bytes for Paillier ciphertexts plus 9 bytes for OPE ciphertexts plus 17 bytes for
the randomized ciphertext at the main encrypted table that will be at the master server. For string
columns, only deterministic ciphertexts are migrated to the extended columns and randomized
ciphertexts at the main encrypted table at the master cloud. For the index column, we need 28 bytes
(4 bytes for each extended table, which is six + the main table). On the other side, in CryptDB,
each numerical column is extended to three columns (iv [17 bytes], Onion Ord [17 bytes], and
Onion Add [257 bytes]), while the string column is extended to two columns (iv [17 bytes] and
Onion Eq [17 ~ 33 bytes]).
As seen in Table 4.13 and Figure 4.18, the OBT has the lowest storage requirement at the
server side, followed by the BVM then the BVSAC. The BVSIT requires a higher space
requirement than the BVSAC since we store the BVs as an independent table rather than a column
in the same encrypted table, as in the BVSAC. The CBF needs about 1,046 bytes for each record,
which is the highest space requirement among the systems. CryptDB scores the second-highest
space requirements, about 1,023 bytes/record.
Table 4.14 indicates the space requirements to store the BVs of the students’ table (Table
4.1) at the QM for different sizes. We can conclude that the BVM requires 25,000 bytes to store
the BVs of the table that holds 10,000 records, while other systems require no hard drive space to
store any data to process a query. According to this, the space overhead is high in the BVM for
executing a query because the whole set of the BVs is loaded from the hard drive into the data
structures in the main memory.
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Table 4.13 Storage requirement per record at the server (cloud) of the encrypted student
table (Table 4.1) in all the systems
Name of the
Data type
Attribute
index
int

4

BVSAC
(bytes)
4

BVSIT
(bytes)
4

BVM (bytes)

OBT

CBF CryptDB
28

0

284

291

ID

varbinary

17

17

17

Name

varbinary

33

33

33

65

66

50

SSN

varbinary

17

17

17

+

284

291

Visa_Type

varbinary

17

17

17

24

34

50

Salary

varbinary

17

17

17

284

291

Department varbinary

33

33

33

66

50

Bit vectors storages

0

4

37*

0

0

0

Total Space required

202

206

239

89

1046

1023

*37 = 20 bytes for storing bits as individual columns (we have 20 bits that require 20 columns of
bit datatype) + 17 bytes for the encrypted index column

Table 4.14 Bits’ storage requirements at the QM when the students’ table has a different
number of tuples
Bits’ storage requirement in bytes at the QM
Model 10,000 records
20,000
50,000
100,000
records
records
records
BVM
25,000
50,000
125,000
250,000
BVSAC

0

0

0

0

BVSIT

0

0

0

0
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Increase Factor

18.00
16.00
14.00
12.00
10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00

Increase Factor

Original

BVM

BVSAC

BVSIT

OBT

CBF

0.00

2.48

2.55

3.12

0.53

17.03

CryptD
B
16.64

Figure 4.18 Comparison of the increase factor of encrypted table space among all systems.
The increase factor (IF) = (x-y) /y , where x= the space required to store the encrypted table, y=
the space required to store the original (unencrypted) table.
4.3.3 Factors that Increase the Efficiency of the Proposed Systems
The number of partitions of a column plays a significant role in the efficiency of our proposed
models. The more partitions there are, the fewer records are fetched from the cloud, and the
efficiency of the models are influenced by the number of fetched encrypted records from the cloud.
Since we encoded the tuples data into bits based on attribute partitioning, the bits searching is
quick, and we are not concerned about the length of the PT, as this contributes to the reduction of
the retrieved encrypted tuples from the cloud.
Having a balanced tuples distribution among the partitions of every sensitive attribute is
another challenge the data owner must account for. For illustration, one can suppose column A is
partitioned into A1, A2, and A3; 50% of the records have their values of A fall under partition A1,
30% fall under A2, and 20% are mapped to A3. If a select query executed to retrieve a record falls
under A1, then 50% of the encrypted records are retrieved, while if the query result exists in the
records mapped to A3, 20% of the encrypted records are fetched from the cloud. How to partition
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the columns of a table exceeds the scope of this dissertation; however, there is a penalty that studies
have proposed to partition the columns, such as in [18], [20]. In [40], four methods can be used by
the data owner to partition the columns into different partition domains, and each method works
differently to divide each column into partitions based on its values. In future work, we will study
this issue to design a partitioning algorithm to perform a fair partitioning for a table’s columns.
4.4

Discussion

As observed in the conducted experiments, we evaluated each proposed model; then, we compared
the models in terms of query processing speed, computation overhead, storage requirements at the
QM, and the cloud server. In the terms of the speed, the main cause of the delay was the amount
of data to be decrypted; however, all the proposed prototypes intended to reduce the amount of
retrieved encrypted data from the cloud to less than 35%. The cause of having a variation in a
query processing speed is linked to how and where the BVs are stored. The delay of the BVM is
mainly affected by the BV transportation from the hard drive HDD to the memory, while in the
BVSIT, we avoided this matter by storing the BVs as an independent relational table in the cloud.
In the BVSAC, the BVs were stored as an additional column in the same encrypted table in the
cloud. For single users restricted by the allowed cloud space, the BVM is the optimal model
because it requires the minimum additional space to manage and process the encrypted relational
tables. However, the computation overhead and the memory consumption at the QM will likely be
a problem if more than a user shares the same computation resource since the whole set of BVs of
the table must be loaded to the main memory to execute a query. Thus, the BVM is not
recommended for a multi-user system, and the optimal model is the BVSAC, followed by the
BVSIT. The BVSAC experienced the shortest execution time, the second-lowest space
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requirement in the cloud, and the lowest storage requirements at the QM, meaning it is suitable for
both single- and multi-user systems.
In terms of security, all the proposed models were at the highest security level. In the CBF,
if the cloud providers did not collude, the security was high; however, it is not guaranteed, which
downgrades the security level. In CryptDB, the authors suggested not putting back layers, which
also reduces the security level. The OBT was secure if a randomized encryption algorithm was
used; otherwise, the security level was reduced. For tables with excessive columns, such as
thousands, the performance of the OBT would be jeopardized since the data of all the fields for
each row are concatenated in one block. In the CBF, thousands of clouds were needed to store the
extended columns, which makes this system impractical. In contrast, the proposed systems avoided
such a problem because we performed cell-based encryption. We stored all the data on the same
cloud server, which accelerated the query processing time for scalable databases. In Table 4.15,
we provide a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed systems in this
research and the systems we compared our systems with.
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Table 4.15 Summary of the advantages and disadvantages of the schemes evaluated in this dissertation.

BVM

Advantages

BVSAC
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✓ High security level.
✓ Has the least cloud space requirements among the
proposed systems and the second-least among all systems.
✓ Faster query processing with smaller databases.
✓ Can support both single- and multi-key encryption.
✓ Keeps the same structure of the original table.
✓ Uses one cloud to outsource the encrypted data.
✓ The optimal choice for individual users who are limited by
the space in the cloud and seek a faster execution time.
✓ High security level.
✓ Has the least overhead (in terms of computation and space)
at the QM.
✓ Processes queries over larger databases faster than others.
✓ Can support both single- and multi-key encryption.
✓ Keeps the same structure as the original table.
✓ Uses one cloud to outsource the data.
✓ Moves about 50% of the computation to the cloud server.
✓ Is the optimal choice for dealing with huge databases in
both single- and multi-user systems that are not limited by
the space in the cloud and seek a faster execution time.
✓ Has the least insertion and update latency, which makes it
the best option for applications that might experience a
high volume of these two operations.

Disadvantages

 Higher overhead (in terms of computation and space) at the
QM because of query translation.
 Most of the computations are performed at the QM, which
makes it unsuitable for multi-user systems.
 Does not support addition and multiplication (+,*).

 Experiences a higher delay than other proposed systems when
dealing with smaller databases.
 Higher delay than other proposed systems in the join and
intersection operators.
 Does not support addition and multiplication (+,*).

Table 4.15 (Cont.)

BVSIT

Advantages
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓

✓

CBF
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OBT

✓

✓

Disadvantages

 Experiences the highest delay in comparison to the other
proposed systems when applied over large databases.
 Has the highest insert and update delay.
 Has the highest space requirement for the outsourced table
among the other proposed systems.
 Needs to communicate with the cloud server twice to process
each query.
 Does not support addition and multiplication (+,*).
 Loses the main table structure.
 Does not support multi-key-based encryption.
 Works only for databases that have a small number of
Requires the minimum space requirement among all
attributes.
systems.
 An inaccurate update could happen if the value to be updated
Secure if a randomized encryption algorithm is used.
matches two or more sub-strings in the same row.
Uses one cloud to outsource the encrypted data.
 Does not support the intersection operator.
 Does not support addition and multiplication (+,*).
 Supports only select * but not select (column).
 Not practical for single users since N accounts in N different
clouds need to be maintained.
 Experiences an exponential delay growth as the number of
Enables the cloud server to execute SQL operators over
predicates in a query increase.
encrypted data.
 The security level is downgraded if more than one cloud
Supports the functions of CryptDB and achieves processes
provider colludes.
queries faster than CryptDB.
 Works only for tables with a small number of attributes.
 Requires the most space among all the systems to outsource
the encrypted table.
High security level.
Works better with smaller databases.
Moves about 39% of the computation to the cloud server.
Can support both single- and multi-key encryption.
Keeps the same structure as the original table.
Is the optimal choice for dealing with small databases in
both single- and multi-user systems that are not limited by
the space in the cloud and seek a faster execution time.

Table 4.15 (Cont.)

CryptDB

Advantages

✓
✓
✓
✓

Disadvantages
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 The security level is low because the secret key (sk) is
passed to the cloud server. Although the server provider is
trusted, they might be curious.
 It is vulnerable to in-session attacks and inference attacks.
 Authors suggest not to put back layers since that will cause
computation overhead; however, that will downgrade the
Moves over 91% of the computation overhead to the cloud
security level.
server.
 Requires the second-most amount of space among all the
Supports most relational algebra operators.
systems to outsource the encrypted table.
Can support both single- and multi-key encryption.
 Works for small tables only, because if it is applied to larger
Supports single- and multi-user systems.
tables, the computation delay will be incredibly high.
 The data owner needs to install their own user-defined
functions (UDFs) as an extension to the MySQL server in the
cloud server; however, most cloud providers do not allow
clients to install their own software in the cloud server.
Therefore, CryptDB is not currently applicable in the real
cloud environment.

5
5.1

Conclusion and Future Work
Summary

Cloud computing is an attractive computing environment for all kinds of users and companies.
But, privacy breaches, not only by malicious attackers but also by curious providers, is the
downside of this type of service, because users lose access control over outsourced data. There are
many solution for this problem and data encryption is the effective one. However, executing SQL
queries over encrypted data is challenging, especially if a randomized encryption algorithm, like
AES-CBC, is used for the encryption. In this research, we first introduce the QM, a trusted server,
which works as an intermediate between the cloud server and user(s) and performs all the crypto
processes. In addition, we design a novel indexing technique based on predefining partitions for
each sensitive attribute, and then encode each tuple to bits, accordingly. The bits are used to
retrieve candidate tuples for a specific query that minimize the range of the retrieved encrypted
tuples. Based on this encoding scheme, we proposed three different secure systems that each use
a different way to store and maintain the index data (i.e., the bit vectors [BVs]) either locally at
the QM or by migrating the BVs to the cloud sever. For each proposed prototype, we design
different algorithms to accomplish query execution of different SQL relational algebra operators,
and we make it resistant to attack scenarios, such as inference attacks. We test our models by
implementing them and comparing their performance with state-of-the-art systems like CryptDB.
We evaluate them in terms of their execution time requirement and space requirements. We find
that the proposed systems require both less execution time and space when compared with most
other competing systems.
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5.2

Future work

As a future work, we aim to extend the proposed prototypes to support addition and multiplication
operations. That could be achieved by using a different secure algorithm to encrypt the numeric
attributes. Also, since the number of nodes (number of partitions) in the PT used by proposed
systems in this dissertation impacts the efficiency of the developed systems, we aim to develop a
fair partitioning algorithm that can divide sensitive attributes into n partitions where n is a threshold
defined by system administrator. This would allow faster query processing speed by restricting the
number of encrypted tuples retrieval from the cloud.
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